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TO:  IP Law Conference Participants 
FROM: GGU IP Law Center and IP Law Faculty 
RE:  Welcome! 
November 5th, 2010 
Welcome to the 9th Annual IP Law Conference at the Golden Gate University School of 
Law. This year’s conference, titled Recent Developments in Intellectual Property Law 
and Policy, adds a new dimension to prior conferences – a focus on policy issues 
pertaining to IP law.  We have previously limited our presentations to practice-oriented 
approaches, however we recognize that IP law practice is increasingly affected, in very 
significant ways, by the policy issues that underlie the law.   
To address these policy issues, we are pleased to bring IP law professors Madhavi Sunder 
(U.C. Davis School of Law) and Dan Burk (U.C, Irvine School of Law) to present their 
cutting-edge recent scholarship on social networking sites and on the Patent system.  
Continuing our tradition of providing updates on recent developments in IP law, we also 
have panels on trademark and patent law so practitioners and students can become aware 
of key new developments in these critical IP fields of practice. 
We are also excited to add a new subject matter to our program this year:  online gaming 
law.  Veteran IP lawyer Neil Smith has put together a panel of expert attorneys, including 
in-house counsel from Electronic Arts and Zynga, for what promises to be an insightful 
look at issues in this rapidly changing area of the law. 
The IP Law Center has continued this year to bring important participants in the IP bar 
and academy to the University to present their views as part of our Distinguished IP Law 
Speaker Series.  Professor Pamela Samuelson of Berkeley Law School offered a brilliant 
analysis of the Google Book Search Settlement in remarks she presented on October 7th,
and this coming April 11th, 2011 the Center will welcome Ninth Circuit Chief Judge Alex 
Kozinski as our third Distinguished IP Law Speaker. 
The Center’s online presence continues to grow as well.  Our highly praised IP Law Book 
Review will issue its second volume early in 2011, and Professor Greenberg’s IP Buzz 
blog continues to address new issues and cases in IP Law.  Bookmark the main site page, 
www.gguiplc.com to stay abreast of all of the Center’s activities and to link to the review 
and blog. 
Lastly, enjoy the conference, and let us know what you think of the program.  We are 
always looking for ways to improve your experience, and thank you for your attendance 
and support of IP law at Golden Gate. 536 Mission Street 
San Francisco, CA 
94105-2968
Tel: 415.442.6600 
Fax: 415.442.6609 
ww.ggu.edu/law
iplaw@ggu.edu
Sincerely,
Marc Greenberg  William Gallagher  Chester Chuang 
Marc Greenberg 
Marc H. Greenberg is Professor of Law, 
founding Director, and currently Co-Director 
of the Intellectual Property Law Center and 
Program at Golden Gate University of Law.  A 
member of the faculty since 2000, he teaches 
Intellectual Property Survey, Internet and 
Software Law, Intellectual Property and New 
Technology, and Entertainment Law in the IP 
curriculum.  He also teaches Civil Procedure, 
Business Associations and related courses in 
the general curriculum. He is the 2010-2011 
Chair of the Art Law Section of the American 
Association of Law Schools, and is a past co-
chair of the Copyright Section of the San 
Francisco Intellectual Property Law 
Association. 
Professor Greenberg received his A.B. degree in English Literature from the 
University of California, Berkeley; his J.D. from the University of California, 
Hastings College of the Law, where he served as an articles editor of the 
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly and published the first of his scholarly 
works analyzing the First Amendment cases of the Supreme Court's 1978 
term. 
Professor Greenberg's scholarship has focused on legal issues pertaining to 
content on the Internet, obscenity law in online contexts, and copyright issues 
both in the U.S and in China.  He is presently working on a series of articles 
focusing on comic books, graphic novels and the law. His articles have been 
published in the Berkeley Technology Law Journal, The Syracuse Journal of 
Law and Technology, The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law, 
and The Loyola Chicago University Journal of International Law. 
Before joining the GGU faculty, Professor Greenberg practiced IP, 
entertainment and business law, in both transactional work as well as 
litigation, in several firms in Northern California. He was of counsel to 
Chickering and Gregory in San Francisco and was a managing partner in his 
own firm, Nelsen and Greenberg, also in San Francisco. 
William Gallgher 
William Gallagher is Associate Professor 
and Co-Director of the IP Law Center at the 
Golden Gate University School of Law, 
where he teaches courses on intellectual 
property litigation, intellectual property 
law, torts, and legal ethics.  He is also 
currently a Visiting Scholar at the Center 
for the Study of Law and Society at the UC 
Berkeley School of Law (2009-2010).  He 
currently serves on the Executive 
Committee of the State Bar of California’s 
IP Law Section. 
Professor Gallagher previously taught as a lecturer in intellectual 
property law and ethics at the Santa Clara University School of Law.  He 
received his JD from the UCLA School of Law; his Ph.D. from the 
University of California , Berkeley School of Law (Jurisprudence and 
Social Policy Program); his MA from the University of Chicago; and his BA 
from the University of California, Berkeley . 
Professor Gallagher is the author of articles on intellectual property law 
and professional ethics, which have appeared in the Santa Clara Law 
Review, Pepperdine Law Review, Law and Social Inquiry, Center for the 
Study of Law and Society/Jurisprudence and Social Policy Program Faculty 
Working Papers (University of California, Berkeley School of Law), and the 
Law and Politics Book Review.  His edited book, International Essays in 
Law and Society: Intellectual Property, was published in 2007 by Ashgate 
Press.   
Before entering full-time academia, Professor Gallagher was a partner in 
the San Francisco office of Townsend and Townsend and Crew LLP, where 
he specialized in patent, copyright, trademark, trade secret, and related 
intellectual property litigation in both state and federal courts 
nationwide.  
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ChesterChaung


ChesterChuangisanassociateprofessorat
theGoldenGateUniversitySchoolofLaw,
whereheteachescontractsandpatentlaw.
Hisresearchfocusesonpatentlaw.

ProfessorChuangreceivedhisJ.D.fromthe
NewYorkUniversitySchoolofLawandhisB.S.inPharmacyfromthe
OhioStateUniversity.Heistheauthorofarticleswhichhaveappeared
intheEmployeeRightsandEmploymentPolicyJournal(ChicagoKent
CollegeofLaw)andtheNewYorkUniversityLawReview.Hislatest
article,UnjustPatents&BargainingBreakdown:WhenisDeclaratory
ReliefNeeded?,willbepublishedbytheS.M.U.LawReviewinMarch
2011.

Priortoenteringacademia,ProfessorChuangwasSr.Corporate
CounselforElectronicsForImaging,Inc.,aleaderindigitalimagingand
printmanagementsolutionsforthecommercialprintingandenterprise
markets.HealsoworkedpreviouslyasanassociatewithO'Melveny&
MyersandPerkinsCoie,specializinginIPlicensingandlitigation,and
servedasajudicialclerkfortheHon.SaundraBrownArmstrong,U.S.
DistrictCourt,N.D.Cal.
Justin T. Beck 
 
Partner 
Beck, Ross, Bismonte  
& Finley LLP 
 
Justin T. Beck is a partner in 
the firm of Beck, Ross, 
Bismonte & Finley LLP in San 
Jose California, where he 
specializes in intellectual 
property litigation.  Before 
the founding of Beck Ross in 
2006, Mr. Beck was of 
counsel to the firm of Mount & Stoelker P.C. and was 
previously a partner in the Silicon Valley firm of Skjerven 
Morrill LLP, where he had practiced since 1985.  Mr. Beck 
is a 1965 graduate of Stanford University, and received 
his J.D. magna cum laude in 1972 from the University of 
San Francisco. Mr. Beck is an adjunct professor at both 
Golden Gate University School of Law and the University 
Of Oregon School Of Law teaching copyright law and 
patent litigation. He also writes frequently on intellectual 
property issues.   
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How Are These Alike?
False Marking
The Rise and Probable Fall of a Legal Fad
Patent Marking
• §287 – The public is given notice that an 
article is patented by marking with the 
word “patent” or “pat.” and the patent 
number.  If there is a failure to mark, no 
damages shall be recovered in any action 
for infringement except on proof that the 
infringer had been put on notice.
False Marking
• §292 (a):  “Whoever marks …or uses in 
advertising in connection with any 
unpatented article . . . Any word or number 
importing that the same is patented for the 
purpose of deceiving the public . . . Shall be 
fined not more that $500 for every such 
offense.”
• §292 (b):  “Any person may sue for the 
penalty, in which event one-half shall go to 
the person suing and the other to the use of 
the United States.”
Qui Tam
• English common law permitted private 
enforcement of the King’s laws.
• Adopted by the United States in the 19th
Century but fell out of use with the growth 
of government agencies
• § 292, originally enacted in 1842, is one 
of a handful of qui tam survivors
2§292 slumbered for a century Then Along Came:
Forest Group, Inc. 
v. Bon Tool Co., 
590 F.3d 1295, 
1303 (Fed. Cir. 
Dec. 28, 2009)
What is an “offense”
• § 292’s maximum penalty is $500 for each 
“offense” – but what is an offense?
• Courts generally followed the 1st Circuit in 
holding that a continuous series of false 
markings was a single offense 
• In December, the Federal Circuit took a 
fresh look and held that each falsely 
marked article was a separate offense
What’s the Difference?
The Solo Cup Example
• The trial court, applying the 1st Circuit 
rule, found three offenses, with a 
maximum penalty of $1500 
• Under the Federal Circuit rule  
–20+ billion offenses
–$10,800,000,000,000 maximum 
penalty
The Federal Circuit’s Green Light
• “Forest argues that interpreting the fine of 
§ 292 to apply on a per article basis would 
encourage "a new cottage industry" of 
false marking litigation  by plaintiffs who 
have not suffered any direct harm. This, 
however, is what the clear language of the 
statute allows”
Forest Group, Inc. v. Bon Tool Co., 590 F.3d 
1295, 1303 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 28, 2009)
3False Marking Filings
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Defendants Fight Back
Constitutional Issues
• Standing
– No individual injury
– Assignment of sovereign claim
– Stauffer v. Brooks Bros. Inc., ___F.3d ___ 
(Fed. Cir. August 31, 2010)
• “Take Care” Clause
– Intervention by U.S. as of right
Intent 
• Clontech Laboratories Inc v. Invitrogen
Corp., 406 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 
(Defendant has burden of proving it had a 
reasonable belief marking was proper)
• Pequignot v. Solo Cup Company, 608 
F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (Specific intent 
to deceive the public required; merely 
knowing that marking is false and public 
may be deceived insufficient)
Expired Patents
• Many innocent explanations:
– Didn’t know the patent expired
– Somebody dropped the ball
– Waiting for the tooling to wear out
• The Brooks Brothers hint:
– We remand for the court to address. . . Brooks 
Brothers’ motion to dismiss . . . “on the grounds that 
the complaint fails to state a plausible claim to relief 
because it fails to allege an ‘intent to deceive’ the 
public – a critical element of a section 292 claim –
with sufficient specificity to meet the heightened 
pleading requirements for claims of fraud imposed by”
Rule 9(b).
Pleadings
• Rule 8 –notice pleading
• Rule 9(b) – “In alleging fraud or mistake, a 
party must state with particularity the 
circumstances constituting fraud or 
mistake. Malice, intent, knowledge, and 
other conditions of a person's mind may 
be alleged generally.”
4In the District Courts
• Many courts follow the
Brinkmeier cases 
applying  Rule 9(b) to 
dismiss cases absent 
specific facts
• Some district courts , 
including the Eastern 
District of Texas, hold  
9(b) does not apply, or is 
satisfied by general 
allegations 
In re BP Lubricants
• Petition for Writ of Mandamus filed 9/29 
after court denied motion to dismiss.  
Petitioner seeks to have the strict pleading 
requirement adopted  
• The United States has filed an amicus
brief supporting the petitioner
Legislation
• S 515 pending in Senate amended to limit 
§ 292(b) actions to recovery of competitive 
injury
• HR 4954 would limit actions to recovery 
for competitive injury to the plaintiff
• HR 6352 would limit recoveries for all 
offenses in the aggregate to $500 and limit 
standing
Looking Ahead
• BP Lubricants will likely tighten the 
pleading requirements and make it difficult 
for plaintiffs to properly plead a claim for 
relief.
• Patent reform, whenever it is enacted, will 
amend § 292(b), limiting private actions to 
recovery for competitive injury
False Marking Suits – The End?
Robert Morrill 
Partner
Sidley Austin LLP 
Robert Morrill is a partner in 
Sidley’s Palo Alto office, where 
he specializes in intellectual 
property and business litigation. 
He has resolved or tried patent, 
trade secret, trademark, 
copyright, unfair competition, 
wrongful termination, trade 
secret, license and contract disputes for clients in many industries, 
including semiconductors, semiconductor manufacturing 
equipment, computer hardware and software, telecommunications, 
electronics, medical devices, gaming and pharmaceuticals. His 
practice includes cases before the United States International Trade 
Commission, as well as in the Federal and State courts and in 
arbitration.  
Mr. Morrill also has extensive experience as a neutral arbitrator or 
mediator, including international arbitration in the ICC 
International Court of Arbitration and the International Center for 
Dispute Resolution. He has been appointed Special Master by the 
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California and the 
Santa Clara County Superior Court, and he serves as an Early 
Neutral Evaluator and Mediator for the U.S. District Court.  
Before joining Sidley in 2003, Mr. Morrill was a founding partner 
at the law firm of Skjerven Morrill LLP. 
THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT TAKES ON 
PATENT DAMAGES REFORM Players in the Damages Debate 
• Patent damages is the biggest obstacle to patent 
reform
• Electronics/internet (Coalition for Patent Reform)
– Google, Apple and others who get sued over patents – 730 
suits 1996‐2008
– Limit damages from “patent extortion”
• Big pharma, universities (and trolls)
– Patent licensors
– Keep things the way they are
– The Coalition is “aiming to infringe”
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Damages Reform in Congress
• 2007 Draft:  Judge conducts an analysis to ensure 
that a reasonable royalty is applied only to the 
portion of the infringing product properly 
attributable to the claimed invention
• Current  Draft:  District Judges act as “gatekeepers”
who identify the “methodologies and factors that are 
relevant to the determination of damages” and allow 
the jury to “consider only those methodologies and 
factors relevant to making such determination.“
3
Damages Reform in the Federal Circuit
• Former Chief Judge Michel:  excessive 
damages are “mythology” not reflected in the 
case law
• Current law is flexible, allows district courts to 
consider many factors. Proposed reform is 
inflexible and overly constrains fact‐finder
• The Federal Circuit has set about to prove that 
it is up to patent damages reform
4
What’s at Stake?
• $357M:  Lucent v. Gateway (2009)
• $184M:  Cornell v. Hewlett‐Packard 
(2009)
• $240M:  i4i v. Microsoft (2009) 
5
The Measure of Damages
• “damages adequate to compensate for the 
infringement, but in no event less than a 
reasonable royalty “ 35 U.S.C. § 284
• Two types of patent damages:
– Lost profits – usually lost sales
– Reasonable  royalty
• For a reasonable royalty, 
– What is the royalty base?
– What is the royalty rate?
– Royalty base  x royalty rate = damage award6
Experts Long Ruled the 
Reasonable Royalty Roost
• Few cases on reasonable royalty until 2009
• Wide latitude for experts
– Hypothetical license negotiation using the Georgia 
Pacific 
– Royalty rate often set by “Rule of Thumb” that the 
licensee would be willing to pay 25% of its profits
– All industry licenses were “comparable”
– Royalty base was often the end product under the 
entire market value rule
7
The Entire Market Value Rule
A reasonable royalty may be based on the 
entire value of an infringing product which 
incorporates the patented feature, if the 
invention is the basis for consumer demand
8
Lucent v. Gateway
• “Date‐Picker” feature in Microsoft Outlook
• Lucent’s expert used: 
– Entire Market Value Rule
– Comparable licenses, both lump‐sum and running 
royalty
• Lucent sought $561M in running royalties 
(8%)
• Microsoft suggested a lump sum of $6.5M 
• Jury awarded a $357M lump sum
• Damages reversed, “no substantial evidence”
9
Lucent v. Gateway EMVR/Royalty Base
• “lack of evidence demonstrating the patented method of the 
Day patent as the basis—or even a substantial basis—of the 
consumer demand for Outlook”
• “the infringing use of the date‐picker tool on Outlook is but a 
very small component of a much larger software program”
• “no evidence that anybody anywhere at any time ever bought 
Outlook . . . because it had a date picker”
• “the invention is not the reason consumers purchase Outlook”
• “Date‐picker” was “but a tiny feature,” one of “hundreds if not 
thousands or even more features” in Outlook
10
Lucent v. Gateway Royalty Rate
• Actual license rates for similar technology can 
be probative of a “reasonable royalty”
• Lucent’s licenses?
– Some “comparable” licenses  were cross‐licenses 
or licenses to entire portfolios with no shown 
relevance 
– “Doubtful the technology is in any way similar”
– No showing of how to calculate percentage 
royalty using lump sum or “dollars per unit”
licenses
11
Lucent v. Gateway 
Relationship of Base and Rate
• The value of the entire product may be 
used for a royalty base, particularly 
where there is no market for the 
infringing component, if the royalty rate 
adjusts for the proportion of the base 
represented by the infringing feature
• “Real world” licenses often do this
Cornell v. Hewlett‐Packard
• Invention:  A component of the instruction recorder 
buffer in the processor (CPU)
– Instruction recorder buffer
• Is part of
– CPU chip
• Which goes into  
– CPU module
• Which goes into
– CPU “bricks”
• Which go into 
– HP servers and workstations
• Smallest salable unit was the CPU13
Cornell v. Hewlett‐Packard 
Cornell’s First Damages Theory
• Damages base is all HP sales of servers and 
workstations, using the entire market value 
rule
• Judge Rader:
– Interrupted the trial to conduct a Daubert  hearing
– “The Federal Circuit has limited application of the Entire 
Market Value Rule to instances where “the patent‐related 
feature is the basis for customer demand” for an accused 
product that nevertheless contains other features.”
– “Cornell did not . . . Attempt in any way to link consumer 
demand for servers and workstations to the claimed 
invention.”14
Cornell v. Hewlett‐Packard 
Cornell’s Second Damages Theory
• Damages based on sales of CPU bricks, using 
the entire market value rule
• Jury:  0.8% royalty on $23B sales = $184M
• HP moved for JMOL or remittitur
15
Cornell v. Hewlett‐Packard
Entire Market Value Thrown Out
• No evidence that the patented feature drove 
customer demand for bricks (or for HP products)
• No evidence connecting customer demand for 
computer performance to the claimed invention
• Cornell’s expert “included earnings from the sale 
of many components of Hewlett‐Packard's 
products that are not covered at all by the 
claimed invention.”
• Damages reduced to $53M based on CPU sales
16
i4i v. Microsoft
• XML editor in Microsoft Word
• 25% “rule of thumb” and Microsoft’s 76.6 profit 
margin were applied to a $499 “benchmark”
alternative product, and adjusted upward with G‐P 
factors to a royalty of $98 per unit
• Possible to buy a copy of Microsoft Word for $98
• Jury awarded $200M plus $40M in enhanced 
damages 
17
i4i v. Microsoft Continued
• Questioning during oral argument:
– The court did not like the 25% rule
– The court did not like the failure to apportion the 
value of the patented feature relative to the price 
of the product
• Affirmed:  Sufficiency of the evidence not 
challenged
– “had Microsoft filed a pre‐verdict JMOL, it is true 
that the outcome might have been different”
18
Lessons
• Federal Circuit is finally paying attention to 
reasonable royalty damages
• “Anything goes” days of expert witnesses are over
• Evidence will be rigorously reviewed by appellate 
and trial courts
• Comparable licenses must really  be comparable
– Comparable technology 
– Comparable  economic circumstances
• Licenses in settlement of litigation should be used
19
More Lessons
• The 25% rule has little or no support at the Federal 
Circuit
• Reasonable royalty analysis must set the value of the 
patented feature relative to the entire product
• Evidence of customer demand for patented feature 
is necessary for the entire market value rule
– “Demand curves”
– “Customer surveys”
• Defendant should always properly move for JMOL
20
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Madhavi Sunder
Professor of Law 
UC Davis School of Law 
Education 
 B.A., Social Studies, Harvard University 1992 
 J.D., Stanford University 1997 
Professor Sunder is a 2006 Carnegie Scholar and a leading scholar in the legal regulation 
of culture. Her work traverses numerous legal fields, from intellectual property and 
cultural property to human rights law and the First Amendment. She asks how age-old 
legal doctrines impede, rather than facilitate, change and modernity within traditional 
cultures. Adopting an interdisciplinary method, she argues that cultural studies and 
globalization studies can help us to modernize antiquated laws for the 21st century. Her 
recent publications include: "IP3," Stanford Law Review (2006), "The Invention of 
Traditional Knowledge," Law & Contemporary Problems (2007); "The Romance of the 
Public Domain," California Law Review (2004); "Piercing the Veil," Yale Law Journal 
(2003); and "Cultural Dissent," Stanford Law Review (2001). She has authored numerous 
comments and chapters in books and is the editor of Gender and Feminist Theory in Law 
and Society (2006). She is a contributor to Findlaw.com. 
 
Special Interests 
Intellectual Property (Including International Intellectual Property), Law And Cultural 
Studies, Cyberlaw, Women's Rights 
Selected Career Highlights 
 Carnegie Corporation Scholar 2006-2008 
 "IP3" paper selected for Stanford/Yale Jr. Faculty Forum (2006) 
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COPYRIGHT FIRST SALE 
DOCTRINE DOES NOT APPLY TO 
GOODS WHICH ARE PURCHASED 
OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES 
AND IMPORTED INTO THE 
UNITED STATES 
Omega S.A., v. Costco Wholesale 
Corporation ___ F.3d ___ (9th 
Clr. September 3, 2008) 
OMEGA MANUFACTURES WATCHES In 
Switzerland and sells them throughout 
the world and in the United States. 
Each watch has on the back an "Omega 
Globe Design" which has been copy-
righted in the United States, no doubt 
with the view to use the copyright to 
keep out foreign goods such as those at 
issue here. 
Discount store Costco purchases 
watches on the "gray market" from 
ENE Limited, a New York company, 
which purchased the watches from 
authorized Omega watch dealers over-
seas. Although Omega authori zed the 
initial foreign sale of the watches, it did 
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Official Publication of the Intellectual Property law Section of the State Bar of California 
not authorize the importation of the 
watches into the United States or the 
sales made by Costco, and filed this 
copyrighr infringement in the Central 
Districr of California. The parties filed 
cross motions for summary judgment, 
with Costco arguing that the "first sale 
doctrine" under 17 U.S.c. § 109(a) 
applied to provide a defense to any 
copyright infringement. 
The First Sale Doctrine 
The firstsale doctrine of Copyright Act 
§ 109 (a) provides: "Notwithstanding 
the provisions of section 106(3), the 
owner of a particular copy .. .lawfully 
made under this tirle, or any person 
authorized by such owner, is entirled, 
without the authority of the copyright 
owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of 
the possession of that copy .... " 
Section 602 (a) of the Copyright Act 
prevents importarion of copies of copy-
righred works into the United States, 
without the authority of the owner 
of copyright: "Importation into the 
United States, without the authority of 
the owner of copyright under this tirle, 
of copies ... of a work that have been 
acquired outside the United Srates is an 
infringement of the exclusive right to 
distribute copies ... under section 106, 
actionable under section 501." Further, 
section 106(3) of the Copyright Act 
gives a copyright owner control of dis-
tribution. It stares: "Subjecr to secrions 
107 through 122, the owner of copy-
right under this tirle has the exclu-
sive rights ... to distribute copies ... of 
the copyrighted work to rhe public 
by sale or other transfer of ownership, 
or by rental, lease, or lending." The 
question here is the interplay between 
the three sections, the first sale doc-
trine, the exclusive right to distribute, 
and the right to prevent importation, 
which rightfully belong to the copy-
right owner. 
The District Court granted sum-
mary judgment to Costco applying the 
first sale doctrine. 
In its 1998 decision Quality King 
Distributors, Inc. v. Lanza Research 
International, Inc., l the Supreme Court 
held the first sale doctr ine ro pro-
vide a defense allowing a defendant to 
sell copyrighted goods which had been 
manufactured in the United States, 
shipped outside the United States, and 
then ultimately imported back and sold 
into the United States without the 
consent of the copyright owner. In this 
case, the Omega watches were actu-
ally manufactured and obtained abroad 
from an authorized foreign distributor, 
then brought in through importation 
into the U.S. by ESS, and then sold here 
by Costco. 
The Court noted that before Quality 
King was decided by the Supreme Court, 
Ninth Circuit precedent was clear that 
the first sale provision § 109(a) pro-
vided no defense against a claim of 
infringement for importation of goods 
which had been made outside the United 
States, unless the goods had already been 
first sold in the United States with the 
permission of the copyright owner. 
The defendant, Costco had argued, 
and the District court had held, that prior 
Ninth Circuit decisions had been implic-
irly overruled by the Quality King deci-
sion of the Supreme Court. For example, 
the Ninth Circuit had previously held in 
BMG Music v. Perez," that the first sale 
doctrine provided no defense against a 
claim of unlawful importation under 602 
(a) against foreign-manufactured import-
ed goods. As the court there said, the 
words "lawfully made under this tirle" in 
§ 109(a) "grant first sale protection only 
to copies legally made and sold in the 
United States," and the copies at issue 
there were made and first sold abroad. 
The Ninth Circuit in Omega noted that 
the rational for this interpretation was 
twofold: First, "a contrary interpreta-
tion would impermissibly extend the 
Copyright Act extraterritorially, [and] 
second, the application of§ 109(a) after 
foreign sales would 'render § 602 virtu-
ally meaningless''' ... because importa-
tion is almost always preceded by at 
least one lawful foreign sale that will 
have exhausted the distribution right on 
which § 602 is premised. 
Another prior case, Denbicare USA. 
Inc. v. Toys (~» Us) Inc.,3 involved cop-
ies made in Hong Kong and voluntarily 
sold in the United States by the US 
Copyright owner, applied the first sale 
exception to infringement, because the 
goods imported by third parties into the 
United States prior to the defendants 
purchase and resale of them, although 
foreign made, had been voluntarily sold 
within the United States. The U.S. sale 
had "exhausted the exclusive rights of 
distribution." 
With this as a background, the 
Ninth Circuit considered the effect of 
the Supreme Court's decision in Quality 
King, and held that the Quality King 
decision did not overrule such cases 
as BMG Music and Denbicare) since 
the goods in Quality King had been 
manufactured inside the United States. 
Justice Ginsburg, in her concurring 
opinion in Quality King specifically rec-
ognized that Quality King involved only 
domestically manufactured copies and, 
as she noted, "the Court did not address 
the effect of § 109(a) on claims involv-
ing unauthorized importation of copies 
made abroad. We do not today resolve 
cases in which the allegedly infringing 
imports were manufactured abroad." 
Since the Omega watches sold by 
Costco were manufactured abroad and 
never sold in the United States, the 
court held the application of the first 
sale doctrine inapplicable, and thus that 
the decision in Quality King had not 
changed the rule. 
The Ninth Circuit wrestled with 
the question whether the reasoning 
of Quality King, that applied § 109 to 
foreign-made goods, would violate the 
presumption against the extraterrito-
rial application of U.S. law, and should 
change the result, and concluded that 
it did not. The court noted that in the 
Quality King decision's only direct lan-
guage on the issue was Judge Ginsburg's 
concurring opinion, citing a copyright 
treatise for the proposition that "law-
fully made under this title" means 
"lawfully made in the United States." 
The Court concluded that its general 
rule that § 109(a) refers "only to copies 
legally made .. .in the United States," is 
not clearly irreconcilable with Quality 
King, and, therefore, remains binding 
precedent. Under this rule, the first sale 
doctrine is unavailable as a defense to 
the claims under §§ 106(3) and 602(a) 
because there is no genuine dispute 
that Omega manufactured the watches 
bearing the copyrighted Omega Globe 
Design in Switzerland. 
Critics of the Ninth Circuit deci-
sion in Omega have suggested that 
applying the first sale doctrine to 
copyrighted goods manufactured in 
the United States, exported, and then 
imported into the United States, would 
encourage trademark owners concerned 
about "gray market goods" or "parallel 
imports," to shift their manufactur-
ing sources outside the United States. 
While this may be the result, the deci-
sion falls naturally from the law in the 
Ninth Circuit, not overruled by Quality 
King, and, time will tell whether this 
interpretation of the law will cause any 
shifts in manufacturing outside the 
United States . • 
Endnotes 
1. Quality King Distributors, Inc. v. L'anza 
Research International, Inc., 523 u.s. 
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2. BMG Music v. Perez, 952 F.2d 318 
(9,h Cir. 1991). 
3. Denbicare US.A. Inc. v. Toys ''R'' Us, 
Inc., 84 F.3d 1143 (9,h Cir. 1996). 
The author was counsel to the defen-
dant Toys "R" Us, Inc. in this case. 
VIDEO GAME DEPICTION OF 
LOS ANGELES STRIP CLUB IS 
NOT INFRINGEMENT AND IS 
PROTECTED UNDER THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT. 
ESS Entertainment 2000, Inc. d/ 
b/a Playpen v. Rock Star Video, 
Inc. et al. F.3d 
November 5, 2008 
IN THIS INTERESTING CASE the Ninth 
Circuit considers trademark infringe-
ment and unfair competition within 
the content of a video game. 
Rock Star Games, Inc., manufac-
tures the Grand Theft Auto series of 
video games, which includes Grant 
Theft Auto: San Andreas. The series 
is known for an irreverent and some-
times crass brand of humor, gratuitous 
violence and sex, and overall seediness. 
The San Andreas game allows a player 
to experience a version of West Coast 
"gangster" culture, taking place in West 
Coast cities, with Los Santos, one of the 
cities, mimicking the look and feel of 
actual Los Angeles neighborhoods. Los 
Santos is populated with virtual liquor 
stores, ammunition dealers, casinos, 
pawnshops, tattoo parlors, bars, and 
strip clubs. 
The artist who designed the video 
game visited Los Angeles neighbor-
hoods, taking pictures, including a pic-
ture of a Los Angeles strip club occu-
pied by plaintiff ESS Entertainment. 
This strip club features females dancing 
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nude, and is named the "Play Pen." ESS 
("Play Pen") filed a suit against Rock 
Star for trade dress infringement and 
unfair competition under Section 43 of 
the Lanham Act, 15 U.s.c. § 1125(a) 
and trademark infringement and unfair 
competition under California law. ESS 
complains that Rock Star has used 
Play Pen's logo and trade dress in its 
video game visual of its "Pig Pen bar," 
and used Play Pen's distinctive logo and 
trade dress without authorization, cre-
ating a likelihood of confusion among 
consumers as to whether ESS or its 
"Play Pen" bar has endorsed, or is asso-
ciated with, the video game. 
In the Los Angeles district court 
Rock Star moved for and was granted 
summary judgment on all claims. It 
argued the affirmative defense that it 
was making nominative fair use of a 
visual display of the "Play Pen," and 
that, in any event, the First Amendment 
protected it against liability. It also 
argued that its use of ESS's intellec-
tual property did not infringe, since 
its video game usage did not create any 
likelihood of confusion. 
While rejecting the defense of nomi-
native fair use, the district court grant-
ed summary judgment based on the 
First Amendment defense, and found 
it unnecessary to address the trademark 
infringement claims directly. 
This Is Not Nominative Fair Use 
Nominative Fair Use is the fair use 
scenario when the accused infringer 
uses "the trade mark term to describe 
not its own product but the plaintiff's."l 
The doctrine protects those who delib-
erately use another's trademark or trade 
dress for the purposes of comparison, 
criticism or point of reference. The 
Ninth Circuit looked at the video game 
and its purpose, and concluded that the 
use of the video game was not nomina-
tive fair use. First, the video game's use 
of "Pig Pen" was not "identical to the 
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plaintiff's mark." Rock Star had "testi-
fied the goal in designing the Pig Pen 
was ... not to comment on Play Pen per 
se." Since Rock Star did not use the Pig 
Pen logo to describe the Play Pen Strip 
Club, the Ninth Circuit noted that the 
district court correctly held that the 
nominative fair use defense did not 
apply. The nominative fair use defense 
is for a defendant's use of the plaintiff's 
trademark to describe the plaintiff or 
its goods or services; this was not the 
case here. Rock Star wanted only a Los 
Angeles genre, seedy neighborhood and 
a strip club, but was not seeking to imi-
tate the Play Pen. 
Rock Star's second defense was the 
First Amendment. As the court noted, 
the First Amendment is appropriate as a 
defense to an infringement claim under 
the Lanham Act "to apply to artistic 
works only where the public interest in 
avoiding consumer confusion outweighs 
the public interest in free expression." 
The Court cited its decision in Matte! 
Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods.,2 where 
an artist was permitted to use Mattel's 
Barbie Dolls in his artwork. 
In order for there to be a First 
Amendment defense, two findings are 
necessary: First, an artistic work's use 
of a trademark that otherwise would 
violate the Lanham Act is not action-
able "unless the [use of the mark] has 
no artistic relevance to the underlying 
work whatsoever, or, if it has some 
artistic relevance, unless [it] explicitly 
misleads as to the source or the content 
of the work." The court noted initially 
that although this test traditionally 
applies to uses of a trademark in the 
title of an artistic work, it found no 
principled reason why it ought not to 
apply equally to the use of a trademark 
in the body of a work. 
Although ESS acknowledged that 
the game was artistic and that the test 
applied, it argued both that the incor-
poration of the Pig Pen bar into the 
game had no artistic relevance and that 
its use of it was not explicitly mislead-
ing. First ESS observed that the game 
was not "about" ESS's Play Pen Club 
the way the artwork was about the 
Barbie doll in the Mattei case, and sec-
ondly that unlike the Barbie case, where 
the trademark, Barbie Doll, was a cul-
tural icon, ESS's Play Pen was hardly a 
cultural icon. 
The Ninth Circuit analyzed the law 
in terms of its own case, Matte! v. MeA 
Records) Inc.,3 another Barbie Doll case 
where Mattel had sued a record com-
pany with a song called "Barbie Girl" 
which was a commentary about Barbie 
and the values she supposedly repre-
sented. The court in this Matte! case 
had applied the First Amendment test 
to hold that it protected the record 
company, noting that the accused song 
was about the Barbie doll. 
ESS agreed that in the Mattei case 
the only indication that Mattel might 
be associated with the song was the 
use of "Barbie" in the title. The Ninth 
Circuit noted that ESS's objections, 
though factually accurate, missed the 
point of the rule. Under the Barbie song 
case and others that followed it "only 
the use of a trademark with 'no artistic 
relevance to the underlying work what-
soever' does not merit First Amendment 
protection." In other words, as the court 
noted, "the level of relevance merely 
must be above zero." The court noted 
that in this case, while it was true that 
the game was not about the Play Pen 
the way the Barbie Girl song was about 
the Barbie doll, given the low threshold 
of relevance the game must surmount, 
this fact would hardly be dispositive. 
Secondly the court also noted it was 
also true that the Play Pen bar had "little 
cultural significance, but that the same 
could be said about most of the indi-
vidual establishments in East L.A.; its 
distinctiveness lies in its" look and feel," 
not in particular destinations. As the 
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court noted, that neighborhood with all 
its seedy characteristics was relevant to 
Rock Star's artistic goal, which was to 
develop a cartoon-style parody of East 
Los Angeles. The court found that pos-
sibly the only way, or at least certainly 
a reasonable way, to do this would be 
to recreate a critical mass of the busi-
nesses and buildings there, as the game 
did. As such the court concluded that 
to include a strip club that is similar in 
"look and feel" to the Play Pen strip club 
does indeed have at least "some artistic 
relevance," so as to support the applica-
tion of the First Amendment here. 
Thus the First Amendment applied 
as a defense to infringement and unfair 
competition, since the video game was 
an artistic work, where the public inter-
est in avoiding customer confusion did 
not outweigh the public interest in 
free expression. The use of the image 
had artistic relevance to the underlying 
work, and did not explicitly mislead 
customers as to the source or content 
of the work. 
As to confusion, the Ninth Circuit 
noted that while the purpose of the 
Lanham Act was to avoid confusion 
in the marketplace, the relevant ques-
tion here was whether the game would 
confuse its players into thinking that 
the Play Pen was somehow behind the 
Pig Pen, or that it sponsors or authorizes 
the video games. In other words the 
mere use of a trademark alone would 
not suffice to make such use explicitly 
misleading. 
The court analyzed the two bars 
and uses, and found that while the 
San Andreas Game, and the Play Pen 
strip club both "offer a form of low 
brow entertainment," that besides this 
general similarity, they have nothing in 
common. Video games and strip clubs 
do not as the court noted "go together 
like a horse and carriage or, perish the 
thought, love and marriage." Nothing 
would indicate that the buying public 
could reasonably have believed that ESS 
produced the video or, that Rock Star 
operated a strip club. The court found 
it farfetched that someone playing the 
game would think that ESS had provid-
ed any expertise support or unique strip 
club knowledge it possesses to the pro-
duction of the game. After all this strip 
club was only a backdrop within the 
game and whatever one can do at the 
Pig Pen, the video game seemed quite 
incidental to the court to the overall 
story of the game. The court concluded 
the reasonable consumer would not 
think that a company that owns one 
strip club in East Los Angeles, which 
was not well known to the public, also 
produces a technologically sophisticated 
video game like San Andreas. 
One has to believe that Judge 
O'Scannlain must have enjoyed writing 
this opinion. As he noted "undeterred, 
ESS also argues that because players are 
free to ignore the storyline and within 
the video game spend as much time 
as they want at the Pig Pen, the Pig 
Pen can be considered to be a signifi-
cant part of the game, thus leading to 
confusion." The court found this argu-
ment to be farfetched, but it certainly 
allows one to raise such issues within 
a virtual world of a video game. Judge 
0' Scannlain answered this argument 
with the analogy to Dodger Stadium. 
As he said "fans can spend all nine 
innings of a baseball game at the hot-
dog stand; that hardly makes Dodger 
Stadium a butcher's shop." As he noted 
"the chance to attend a virtual strip 
club is unambiguously not the main 
selling point of the game.''' 
The virtual world creates another 
most interesting legal issue, but this 
court seems to sanction the background 
use of actual locations, buildings and 
businesses within simulated video and 
virtual worlds, at least where such use 
is either incidental or not explicitly 
misleading . • 
© 2008 Neil Smith. 
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OPINION
CALLAHAN, Circuit Judge: 
Defendants-Appellants California Governor Schwarzeneg-
ger and California Attorney General Brown (the “State”)
appeal the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor
of Plaintiffs-Appellees Video Software Dealers Association
and Entertainment Software Association (“Plaintiffs”), and
the denial of the State’s cross-motion for summary judgment.1
Plaintiffs filed suit for declaratory relief seeking to invalidate
newly-enacted California Civil Code sections 1746-1746.5
(the “Act”), which impose restrictions and a labeling require-
ment on the sale or rental of “violent video games” to minors,
 
1Plaintiffs are associations of companies that create, publish, distribute,
sell and/or rent video games, including games that would be potentially
regulated under the California statutory scheme at issue. 
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on the grounds that the Act violates rights guaranteed by the
First and Fourteenth Amendments.2 
We hold that the Act, as a presumptively invalid content-
based restriction on speech, is subject to strict scrutiny and
not the “variable obscenity” standard from Ginsberg v. New
York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968). Applying strict scrutiny, we hold
that the Act violates rights protected by the First Amendment
because the State has not demonstrated a compelling interest,
has not tailored the restriction to its alleged compelling inter-
est, and there exist less-restrictive means that would further
the State’s expressed interests. Additionally, we hold that the
Act’s labeling requirement is unconstitutionally compelled
speech under the First Amendment because it does not require
the disclosure of purely factual information; but compels the
carrying of the State’s controversial opinion. Accordingly, we
affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to
Plaintiffs and its denial of the State’s cross-motion. Because
we affirm the district court on these grounds, we do not reach
two of Plaintiffs’ challenges to the Act: first, that the language
of the Act is unconstitutionally vague, and, second, that the
Act violates Plaintiffs’ rights under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
I.
A.
On October 7, 2005, Governor Schwarzenegger signed into
law Assembly Bill 1179 (“AB 1179”), codified at Civil Code
§§ 1746-1746.5.3 The Act states that “[a] person may not sell
or rent a video game that has been labeled as a violent video
2All references to “Civil Code” or “section 1746” refer to the California
Civil Code unless otherwise indicated. 
3During the legislative session, A.B. 1179 had been “gutted” and
amended; the language in Assembly Bill 450 (“A.B. 450”) replaced the
original language in A.B. 1179. 
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game to a minor.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1746.1(a).4 Violators are
subject to a civil penalty of up to $1,000. Id. at § 1746.3. 
Central to this appeal, the Act defines a “violent video
game” as follows:
(d)(1) “Violent video game” means a video game in
which the range of options available to a player
includes killing, maiming, dismembering, or sexu-
ally assaulting an image of a human being, if those
acts are depicted in the game in a manner that does
either of the following: 
(A) Comes within all of the following descriptions:
(i) A reasonable person, considering the
game as a whole, would find appeals to a
deviant or morbid interest of minors. 
(ii) It is patently offensive to prevailing
standards in the community as to what is
suitable for minors. 
(iii) It causes the game, as a whole, to lack
serious literary, artistic, political, or scien-
tific value for minors. 
(B) Enables the player to virtually inflict serious
injury upon images of human beings or characters
with substantially human characteristics in a manner
which is especially heinous, cruel, or depraved in
4The parties dispute whether the Act bans purchases or rentals by
minors who are accompanied by their parents. The Act does not speak to
whether there is an exception for sales to minors accompanied by a parent;
it states only that it does not apply “if the violent video game is sold or
rented to a minor by the minor’s parent, grandparent, aunt, uncle, or legal
guardian.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1746.1(c). 
1943VIDEO SOFTWARE v. SCHWARZENEGGER
that it involves torture or serious physical abuse to
the victim. 
Id. at § 1746(d)(1).5 Borrowing language from federal death
penalty jury instructions, the Act also defines the terms
“cruel,” “depraved,” “heinous,” and “serious physical abuse,”6
and states that “[p]ertinent factors in determining whether a
5The State concedes on appeal, consistent with the district court’s con-
clusion, that the alternate definition of “violent video game” in section
1746(d)(1)(B) is unconstitutional because it “does not provide an excep-
tion for material that might have some redeeming value to minors . . . .”
The State’s contention that this section of the Act is severable based on
the severability clause contained in California Civil Code § 1746.5 is sub-
sequently addressed. 
6Section 1746(d)(2) includes the following definitions: 
(A) “Cruel” means that the player intends to virtually inflict a
high degree of pain by torture or serious physical abuse of the
victim in addition to killing the victim. 
(B) “Depraved” means that the player relishes the virtual killing
or shows indifference to the suffering of the victim, as evidenced
by torture or serious physical abuse of the victim. 
(C) “Heinous” means shockingly atrocious. For the killing
depicted in a video game to be heinous, it must involve additional
acts of torture or serious physical abuse of the victim as set apart
from other killings. 
(D) “Serious physical abuse” means a significant or consider-
able amount of injury or damage to the victim’s body which
involves a substantial risk of death, unconsciousness, extreme
physical pain, substantial disfigurement, or substantial impair-
ment of the function of a bodily member, organ, or mental fac-
ulty. Serious physical abuse, unlike torture, does not require that
the victim be conscious of the abuse at the time it is inflicted.
However, the player must specifically intend the abuse apart from
the killing. 
(E) “Torture” includes mental as well as physical abuse of the
victim. In either case, the virtual victim must be conscious of the
abuse at the time it is inflicted; and the player must specifically
intend to virtually inflict severe mental or physical pain or suffer-
ing upon the victim, apart from killing the victim. 
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killing depicted in a video game is especially heinous, cruel,
or depraved include infliction of gratuitous violence upon the
victim beyond that necessary to commit the killing, needless
mutilation of the victim’s body, and helplessness of the victim.”7
Id. at § 1746(d)(2)-(3). 
The Act also imposes a labeling requirement. It requires
that each “violent video game” imported into or distributed in
California must “be labeled with a solid white ‘18’ outlined
in black,” which shall appear on the front face of the game’s
package and be “no less than 2 inches by 2 inches” in size.
Id. at § 1746.2. 
A.B. 1179 states that the State of California has two com-
pelling interests that support the Act: (1) “preventing violent,
aggressive, and antisocial behavior”; and (2) “preventing psy-
chological or neurological harm to minors who play violent
video games.” A.B. 1179 also “finds and declares” that:
(a) Exposing minors to depictions of violence in
video games, including sexual and heinous violence,
makes those minors more likely to experience feel-
ings of aggression, to experience a reduction of
activity in the frontal lobes of the brain, and to
exhibit violent antisocial or aggressive behavior. 
(b)  Even minors who do not commit acts of vio-
lence suffer psychological harm from prolonged
exposure to violent video games. 
The State included in the excerpts of record several hun-
dred pages of material on which the Legislature purportedly
relied in passing the Act. While many of the materials are
social science studies on the asserted impact of violent video
7Legislative materials in the record indicate that the Legislature used
these terms in the Act because they survived claims of unconstitutional
vagueness in United States v. Jones, 132 F.3d 232 (5th Cir. 1998). 
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games on children, other documents are varied and include
legal analyses, general background papers, position papers,
etc. Dr. Craig Anderson, whose work is central to the State’s
arguments in this case, is listed as an author of roughly half
of the works included in the bibliography. 
B.
The content of the video games potentially affected by the
Act is diverse. Some of the games to which the Act might
apply are unquestionably violent by everyday standards, digi-
tally depicting what most people would agree amounts to
murder, torture, or mutilation. For example, the State submit-
ted a videotape that contains several vignettes from the games
Grand Theft Auto: Vice City, Postal 2, and Duke Nukem 3D,
which demonstrate the myriad ways in which characters can
kill or injure victims or adversaries.8 The record also contains
descriptions of several games, some of which are based on
popular novels or motion pictures, which are potentially cov-
ered by the Act. Many of these games have extensive plot
lines that involve or parallel historical events, mirror common
fictional plots, or place the player in a position to evaluate and
make moral choices. 
The video game industry has in place a voluntary rating
system to provide consumers and retailers information about
video game content. The Entertainment Software Rating
Board (“ESRB”), an independent, self-regulated body estab-
lished by the Entertainment Software Association, rates the
content of video games that are voluntarily submitted. ESRB
assigns each game one of six age-specific ratings, ranging
from “Early Childhood” to “Adults Only.”9 It also assigns to
8We note that the State’s videotape contains heavily edited selections of
the violence that can be meted out, but does not include any context or
possible storyline within which the violence occurs. 
9The age ratings include “EC” (Early Childhood), “E” (Everyone),
“E10+” (Everyone Ten and Older), “T” (Teen [13+]), “M” (Mature
[17+]), and “AO” (Adults Only [18+]). 
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each game one of roughly thirty content descriptors, which
include “Animated Blood,” “Blood and Gore,” “Cartoon Vio-
lence,” “Crude Humor,” “Fantasy Violence,” “Intense Vio-
lence,” “Language,” “Suggestive Themes,” and “Sexual
Violence.” 
C.
On October 17, 2005, before the Act took effect, Plaintiffs
filed suit against the Governor, the Attorney General, and
three city and county defendants, all in their official capaci-
ties, for declaratory relief against the Act on the grounds that
it violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. Plaintiffs argued that the Act unconstitutionally
restricted freedom of expression on its face based on content
regulation and the labeling requirement, was unconstitution-
ally vague, and violated equal protection. 
The district court granted Plaintiffs’ motion for a prelimi-
nary injunction. Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Schwar-
zenegger, 401 F. Supp. 2d 1034 (N.D. Cal. 2005).
Subsequently, the parties filed cross-motions for summary
judgment. The district court granted Plaintiffs’ motion and
denied the State’s cross-motion. See Video Software Dealers
Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, No. C-05-04188, slip op. (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 6, 2007). The district court’s summary judgment order
invalidated the Act under strict scrutiny, and did not reach
Plaintiffs’ claims regarding vagueness, equal protection, or
the Act’s labeling requirement. The district court permanently
enjoined enforcement of the Act. The State timely appealed.
II.
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo and must
“determine, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party, whether there are any genuine issues
of material fact and whether the district court correctly
applied substantive law.” Ballen v. City of Redmond, 466 F.3d
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736, 741 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). We draw all reasonable inferences supported
by the evidence in the nonmoving party’s favor. Id. We “may
affirm summary judgment on any ground supported by the
record.” Doran v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 524 F.3d 1034, 1039 n.3
(9th Cir. 2008).
III.
[1] We first address Plaintiffs’ argument that the entire Act
should be invalidated based on the State’s concession on
appeal that the alternate definition of “violent video game”
found in section 1746(d)(1)(B) is unconstitutionally broad.
The State counters that the Act is saved by the severability
clause in Civil Code § 1746.5, which states: “The provisions
of this title are severable. If any provision of this title or its
application is held to be invalid, that invalidity shall not affect
other provisions or applications that can be given effect with-
out the invalid provision or application.” We hold that the Act
is not wholly invalid as a result of the State’s concession. 
[2] We look to state law to determine the effect of the sev-
erability clause. Qwest Commc’ns Inc. v. City of Berkeley,
433 F.3d 1253, 1259 (9th Cir. 2006), overruled on other
grounds, Sprint Telephony PCS, L.P. v. County of San Diego,
543 F.3d 571 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). Under California law,
there is a general presumption in favor a statute’s constitu-
tionality. Ex parte Blaney, 184 P.2d 892, 900 (Cal. 1947)
(“[T]he general presumption of constitutionality, fortified by
the express statement of a severability clause, normally calls
for sustaining any valid portion of statute unconstitutional in
part.”). An invalid portion of a statute 
can be severed if, and only if, it is “grammatically,
functionally and volitionally separable.” It is “gram-
matically” separable if it is “distinct” and “separate”
and, hence, “can be removed as a whole without
affecting the wording of any” of the measure’s
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“other provisions.” It is “functionally” separable if it
is not necessary to the measure’s operation and pur-
pose. And it is “volitionally” separable if it was not
of critical importance to the measure’s enactment. 
Hotel Employees & Rest. Employees Int’l Union v. Davis, 981
P.2d 990, 1009 (Cal. 1999) (citations omitted); see also Jevne
v. Superior Court, 111 P.3d 954, 971 (Cal. 2005). 
[3] Section 1746(d)(1)(B) is grammatically and function-
ally separable because, as an alternate definition of “violent
video game,” it can be removed from the Act without affect-
ing the wording or function of the Act’s other provisions.
Plaintiffs contend, however, that such a deletion does not
account for the phrase “does either of the following” in sec-
tion 1746(d)(1), which is the lead-in language to the alternate
definitions of “violent video game,” and that retaining this
phrase results in a “conundrum and grammatical error.” Plain-
tiffs’ concerns are accounted for by the simultaneous deletion
of the phrase “does either of the following.” Although some
California cases speak in general terms of separability “as a
whole,” see, e.g., Jevne, 111 P.3d at 972, the California
Supreme Court has also evaluated grammatical and functional
separability with respect to whether the valid and invalid por-
tions of a statute or initiative can be “separated by paragraph,
sentence, clause, phrase, or even single words.” Santa Bar-
bara Sch. Dist. v. Superior Court of Santa Barbara County,
530 P.2d 605, 617 (Cal. 1975); see also Ex parte Blaney, 184
P.2d at 900; accord Schweitzer v. Westminster Invs., 69 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 472, 485 (Ct. App. 2007). Here, the phrase “does
either of the following” can be cleanly stricken without doing
violence to the rest of the Act or impermissibly reading into
the statute any exceptions or qualifications. See Fort v. Civ.
Serv. Comm’n of Alameda County, 392 P.2d 385, 390 (Cal.
1964).10 
10Although not argued by the parties, we note that deleting Civil Code
§ 1746(d)(1)(B) also appears to require the deletion of sections 1746(d)(2)
and (d)(3)—which define when a violent act is “cruel,” “depraved,” or
“heinous,” or involves “serious physical abuse” or “torture”—because
these sections only relate to or explain section 1746(d)(1)(B). 
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[4] Sections 1746(d)(1)(B), (d)(2), and (d)(3) are also voli-
tionally separable. We must ask whether the inclusion of these
sections was of critical importance to passage of the Act and
whether the Act “would have been adopted by the legislative
body had [it] foreseen the partial invalidation of the statute.”
Sonoma County Org. of Pub. Employees v. County of
Sonoma, 591 P.2d 1, 14 (Cal. 1979) (citation and internal quo-
tation marks omitted). Evidence in the record indicates that
the Legislature included sections 1746(d)(1)(B), (d)(2) and
(d)(3) in the Act with the express goal of avoiding the consti-
tutional pitfalls identified in Video Software Dealers Associa-
tion v. Maleng, 325 F. Supp. 2d 1180 (W.D. Wash. 2004). An
Assembly Judiciary Committee Mandatory Information
Worksheet to A.B. 450 and a Research Summary to A.B. 450
both indicate that these detailed definition sections were
included in the Act for the purpose of avoiding the result in
Maleng, where a Washington district court struck down a
2003 state statute, in part, because it was not narrowly tai-
lored. Further, the Assembly Third Reading to A.B. 450 also
discusses the tailoring issues in Maleng, and notes that the
Act “regulates the sale of only those games that contain the
most heinous, cruel or depraved acts of violence.” Nonethe-
less, the record does not persuade us that sections
1746(d)(1)(B), (d)(2) and (d)(3) were “critical” to the passage
of the Act. The fact that the Legislature included an alternate
definition for “violent video game” designed to help the Act
withstand a constitutional challenge does not necessarily indi-
cate that it would not have passed the Act but for the inclusion
of these sections. Accordingly, in light of California’s pre-
sumption in favor of retaining constitutional parts of statutes,
we conclude that the Act is not wholly invalid as a result of
the State’s concession.
IV.
[5] Our next task is to determine what level of scrutiny to
apply in reviewing the Act’s prohibitions. Existing case law
indicates that minors are entitled to a significant measure of
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First Amendment protections, that content-based regulations
are presumptively invalid and subject to strict scrutiny, and
that if less restrictive means for achieving a state’s compelling
interest are available, they must be used. The State’s argu-
ment on appeal, that we should not apply strict scrutiny and
instead should apply a “variable obscenity” standard from
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), raises a question
of first impression in this circuit. 
[6] The Supreme Court has stated that “minors are entitled
to a significant measure of First Amendment protection, and
only in relatively narrow and well-defined circumstances may
government bar public dissemination of protected materials to
them.” Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 212-
13 (1975) (citations omitted). The State does not contest that
video games are a form of expression protected by the First
Amendment.11 See Interactive Digital Software Ass’n v. St.
Louis, 329 F.3d 954, 956-58 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding that “vi-
olent” video games are a protected form of speech); Maleng,
325 F. Supp. 2d at 1184-85 (same). It is also undisputed that
the Act seeks to restrict expression in video games based on
its content. See Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. Los Ange-
les County Sheriff Dep’t, 533 F.3d 780, 787 (9th Cir. 2008)
(“[A] law is content-based if either the main purpose in enact-
ing it was to suppress or exalt speech of a certain content, or
it differentiates based on the content of speech on its face.”
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Interactive
Digital Software Ass’n, 329 F.3d at 958 (holding that an ordi-
nance that applied to graphically violent video games was a
content-based restriction). 
11The Supreme Court has not specifically commented on whether video
games contain expressive content protected under the First Amendment;
however, story-laden video games of the type potentially covered under
the Act are similar to movies, which the Court has long held are protected
expression notwithstanding their ability to entertain as well as inform. See,
e.g., Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501-02 (1952). 
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“Content-based regulations are presumptively invalid.”
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992). We ordi-
narily review content-based restrictions on protected expres-
sion under strict scrutiny, and thus, to survive, the Act “must
be narrowly tailored to promote a compelling Government
interest.” United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529
U.S. 803, 813 (2000). “If a less restrictive alternative would
serve the Government’s purpose, the legislature must use that
alternative.” Id.; see also Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v.
FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (“The Government may . . .
regulate the content of constitutionally protected speech in
order to promote a compelling interest if it chooses the least
restrictive means to further the articulated interest.”); Reno v.
ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 876-77 (1997) (finding relevant the fact
that a reasonably effective method by which parents could
prevent children from accessing internet material which par-
ents believed to be inappropriate “will soon be widely avail-
able”). 
The State, however, urges us to depart from this framework
because the Act concerns minors. It argues that we should
analyze the Act’s restrictions under what has been called the
“variable obscenity” or “obscenity as to minors” standard first
mentioned in Ginsberg, 390 U.S. 629. In essence, the State
argues that the Court’s reasoning in Ginsberg that a state
could prohibit the sale of sexually-explicit material to minors
that it could not ban from distribution to adults should be
extended to materials containing violence. This presents an
invitation to re-consider the boundaries of the legal concept of
“obscenity” under the First Amendment. 
[7] In Ginsberg, the Court held that New York State could
prohibit the sale of sexually-explicit material to minors that
was defined by statute as obscene because of its appeal to
minors. Id. at 643, 646. Therefore, the state could prohibit the
sale of “girlie magazines” to minors regardless of the fact that
the material was not considered obscene for adults. Id. at 643.
The Court stated that “[t]o sustain the power to exclude mate-
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rial defined as obscenity by [the statute] requires only that we
be able to say that it was not irrational for the legislature to
find that exposure to material condemned by the statute is
harmful to minors.”12 Id. at 641. The Court offered two justifi-
cations for applying this rational basis standard: (1) that “con-
stitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that the
parents’ claim to authority in their own household to direct
the rearing of their children is basic in the structure of our
society”; and (2) the state’s “independent interest in the well-
being of its youth.” Id. at 639-40. 
The State suggests that the justifications underlying Gins-
berg should apply to the regulation of violent content as well
as sexually explicit material. The assertion, however, fails
when we consider the category of material to which the Gins-
berg decision applies and the First Amendment principles in
which that decision was rooted. 
[8] Ginsberg is specifically rooted in the Court’s First
Amendment obscenity jurisprudence, which relates to non-
protected sex-based expression—not violent content, which is
presumably protected by the First Amendment. See 390 U.S.
at 640. Ginsberg explicitly states that the New York statute
under review “simply adjusts the definition of obscenity to
social realities by permitting the appeal of this type of mate-
rial to be assessed in term of the sexual interests of such
minors.” Id. at 638 (citation, internal quotation marks, and
alterations omitted). The definition of obscenity that Ginsberg
adjusted was the Court’s obscenity test announced in Roth v.
United States, which dealt with obscene materials defined
with reference to sex. 354 U.S. 476, 485-87 (1957) (discuss-
12The statute in Ginsberg used the defined term “harmful to minors,”
which prohibited access by minors when it: “(i) predominantly appeals to
the prurient, shameful or morbid interest of minors, and [¶] (ii) is patently
offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community as a whole with
respect to what is suitable material for minors, and [¶] (iii) is utterly with-
out redeeming social importance for minors.” Id. at 646. 
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ing the nature of obscenity at length and stating, among other
things, that “[o]bscene material is material which deals with
sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest.”). The Gins-
berg Court applied a rational basis test to the statute at issue
because it placed the magazines at issue within a sub-category
of obscenity—obscenity as to minors—that had been deter-
mined to be not protected by the First Amendment, and it did
not create an entirely new category of expression excepted
from First Amendment protection. The State, in essence, asks
us to create a new category of non-protected material based
on its depiction of violence. 
The Supreme Court has carefully limited obscenity to sex-
ual content. Although the Court has wrestled with the precise
formulation of the legal test by which it classifies obscene
material, it has consistently addressed obscenity with refer-
ence to sex-based material. Such was the case in Roth and
Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966), which modi-
fied Roth. And though it post-dates Ginsberg, the Court in
Miller v. California expressly cabined the First Amendment
concept of obscenity in terms of sexual material. 413 U.S. 15,
24 (1973) (“[W]e now confine the permissible scope of such
regulation to works which depict or describe sexual con-
duct.”) 
Circuit courts have resisted attempts to broaden obscenity
to cover violent material as well as sexually-explicit material.
In American Amusement Machine Association v. Kendrick,
which involved a video game restriction that mixed the regu-
lation of sexual and violent material, the Seventh Circuit dis-
cussed why “[v]iolence and obscenity are distinct categories
of objectionable depiction,” explaining that obscenity is con-
cerned with “offensiveness,” whereas ordinances like the one
at issue in Kendrick (and here) are concerned with conduct or
harm. 244 F.3d 572, 574-75 (7th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534
U.S. 994 (2001).13 In Video Software Dealers Association v.
13Citing one law review article, the State also urges us to redefine the
First Amendment meaning of “obscenity”—which involves material
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Webster, the Eighth Circuit held that videos “that contain[ ]
violence but not depictions or descriptions of sexual conduct
cannot be obscene.” 968 F.2d 684, 688 (8th Cir. 1992)
(“Obscenity . . . encompasses only expression that ‘depict[s]
or describe[s] sexual conduct’ ” (citing Miller, 413 U.S. at
24)). Likewise, in Eclipse Enterprises, Inc. v. Gullota, the
Second Circuit declined to place trading cards which depicted
heinous crime that was allegedly harmful to minors in the cat-
egory of unprotected obscenity. 134 F.3d 63, 66-68 (2d Cir.
1997). Further, in James v. Meow Media, Inc., the Sixth Cir-
cuit, in discussing excessively violent movies and video game
material, “decline[d] to extend [its] obscenity jurisprudence to
violent, instead of sexually explicit, material.” 300 F.3d 683,
698 (6th Cir. 2002). 
Finally, we note that the Ginsberg Court suggested its
intent to place a substantive limit on its holding. It stated: 
We have no occasion in this case to consider the
impact of the guarantees of freedom of expression
upon the totality of the relationship of the minor and
the State. It is enough for the purposes of this case
that we inquire whether it was constitutionally
impermissible for New York . . . to accord minors
under 17 a more restricted right than that assured to
adults to judge and determine for themselves what
sex material they may read or see.  
related to sex—by substituting an ordinary definition of obscenity based
on its Latin root. In Maleng, Judge Lasnik rejected the same argument.
325 F. Supp. 2d at 1185. He explained that the phrase “obscene material”
was not inherently limited to sexually explicit material in the ordinary
sense, and that the Latin root “obscaenus” literally means “filth.” Id.
Nonetheless, he held, relying on Miller, 413 U.S. 15, that “when used in
the context of the First Amendment, the word ‘obscenity’ means material
that deals with sex.” Id. This reasoning, dismissing the linguistic argu-
ment, applies equally to the State’s argument here. 
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Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 636-37 (citation omitted). Though not
the clearest of disclaimers, this language telegraphs that the
Court’s concern in Ginsberg was with the relationship
between the state and minors with respect to a certain subject
matter—“sex material” as it relates to the interests of minors.
[9] In light of our reading of Ginsberg and the cases from
our sister circuits, we decline the State’s invitation to apply
the Ginsberg rationale to materials depicting violence, and
hold that strict scrutiny remains the applicable review standard.14
Our decision is consistent with the decisions of several other
courts that have addressed and rejected the argument that the
Ginsberg standard be extended from the field of sex-based
content to violence in video games. See Interactive Digital
Software Ass’n, 329 F.3d at 959; Kendrick, 244 F.3d at 576-
78; Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Granholm, 426 F. Supp. 2d 646,
652 (E.D. Mich. 2006); Maleng, 325 F. Supp. 2d at 1185-86.
At oral argument, the State confirmed that it is asking us to
boldly go where no court has gone before. We decline the
State’s entreaty to extend the reach of Ginsberg and thereby
redefine the concept of obscenity under the First Amendment.
V.
[10] Accordingly, we review the Act’s content-based prohi-
bitions under strict scrutiny. As noted above, “[c]ontent-based
regulations are presumptively invalid,” R.A.V., 505 U.S. at
382, and to survive the Act “must be narrowly tailored to pro-
mote a compelling Government interest.” Playboy Entm’t
Group, Inc., 529 U.S. at 813. Further, “[i]f a less restrictive
alternative would serve the Government’s purpose, the legis-
lature must use that alternative.” Id. 
14We also reject the State’s more general request that we equate violent
content with unprotected “obscenity.” As the discussion above indicates,
the Court’s obscenity jurisprudence limits obscene materials to sex-based
materials. 
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A.
The Legislature stated that it had two compelling interests
in passing the Act: (1) “preventing violent, aggressive, and
antisocial behavior”; and (2) “preventing psychological or
neurological harm to minors who play violent video games.”
Although there was some early confusion over whether the
State was relying on both of these interests, the State subse-
quently clarified that “[t]he physical and psychological well-
being of children is the concern of the Act,” as distinguished
from the interest of protecting third parties from violent
behavior. The State’s focus is on the actual harm to the brain
of the child playing the video game. Therefore, we will not
assess the Legislature’s purported interest in the prevention of
“violent, aggressive, and antisocial behavior.”15 
[11] The Supreme Court has recognized that “there is a
compelling interest in protecting the physical and psychologi-
cal well-being of minors.” Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc., 492
U.S. at 126; see also Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Swanson, 519
15Throughout this litigation, the parties have disagreed as to what extent
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam), applies to this
case. The dispute stems from the fact that one of the compelling interests
advanced by the Legislature is the prevention of “violent, aggressive, and
antisocial behavior.” One of the Legislature’s findings was that
“[e]xposing minors to depictions of violence in video games . . . makes
those minors more likely . . . to exhibit violent antisocial or aggressive
behavior.” However, “[t]he government may not prohibit speech because
it increases the chance an unlawful act will be committed ‘at some indefi-
nite future time.’ ” Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 253
(2002) (citation omitted). It “may suppress speech for advocating the use
of force or a violation of law only if ‘such advocacy is directed to inciting
or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce
such action.’ ” Id. (citing Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447). District courts
analyzing the violence prevention rationale have rejected it. See Entertain-
ment Software Association v. Blagojevich, 404 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1073
(N.D. Ill. 2005); Granholm, 426 F. Supp. 2d at 652; Entm’t Software Ass’n
v. Foti, 451 F. Supp. 2d 823, 831 (M.D. La. 2006); Maleng, 325 F. Supp.
2d at 1187 n.3. 
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F.3d 768, 771 (8th Cir. 2008); Interactive Digital Software
Ass’n, 329 F.3d at 958; Nunez by Nunez v. City of San Diego,
114 F.3d 935, 944 (9th Cir. 1997); Maleng, 325 F. Supp. 2d
at 1186-87. Notwithstanding this abstract compelling interest,
when the government seeks to restrict speech “[i]t must dem-
onstrate that the recited harms are real, not merely conjec-
tural, and that the regulation will in fact alleviate these harms
in a direct and material way.” Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v.
FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 664 (1994) (plurality op.); Swanson, 519
F.3d at 771; Interactive Digital Software Ass’n, 329 F.3d at
958-59. Although we must accord deference to the predictive
judgments of the legislature, our “obligation is to assure that,
in formulating its judgments, [the legislature] has drawn rea-
sonable inferences based on substantial evidence.” Turner
Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 195 (1997) (citations
and quotation marks omitted); see also Playboy Entm’t
Group, Inc., 529 U.S. at 822 (“This is not to suggest that a
10,000-page record must be compiled in every case or that the
Government must delay in acting to address a real problem;
but the Government must present more than anecdote and
supposition. The question is whether an actual problem has
been proved . . . .” ). 
In evaluating the State’s asserted interests, we must distin-
guish the State’s interest in protecting minors from actual psy-
chological or neurological harm from the State’s interest in
controlling minors’ thoughts. The latter is not legitimate. The
Supreme Court has warned that the 
government cannot constitutionally premise legisla-
tion on the desirability of controlling a person’s pri-
vate thoughts. First Amendment freedoms are most
in danger when the government seeks to control
thought or to justify its laws for that impermissible
end. The right to think is the beginning of freedom,
and speech must be protected from the government
because speech is the beginning of thought. 
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Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 253 (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted.) In Kendrick, the Seventh Circuit commented
on a psychological harm rationale in the violent video game
context: 
Violence has always been and remains a central
interest of humankind and a recurrent, even obses-
sive theme of culture both high and low. It engages
the interest of children from an early age, as anyone
familiar with the classic fairy tales collected by
Grimm, Andersen, and Perrault is aware. To shield
children right up to the age of 18 from exposure to
violent descriptions and images would not only be
quixotic, but deforming; it would leave them
unequipped to cope with the world as we know it. 
244 F.3d at 579; see also Interactive Digital Software Ass’n,
329 F.3d at 960 (“Speech that is neither obscene as to youths
nor subject to some other legitimate proscription cannot be
suppressed solely to protect the young from ideas or images
that a legislative body thinks unsuitable for them.”) (citation
and quotation marks omitted). Because the government may
not restrict speech in order to control a minor’s thoughts, we
focus on the State’s psychological harm rationale in terms of
some actual effect on minors’ psychological health. 
[12] Whether the State’s interest in preventing psychologi-
cal or neurological harm to minors is legally compelling
depends on the evidence the State proffers of the effect of
video games on minors. Although the Legislature is entitled
to some deference, the courts are required to review whether
the Legislature has drawn reasonable inferences from the evi-
dence presented. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 520 U.S. at
195. Here, the State relies on a number of studies in support
of its argument that there is substantial evidence of a causal
effect between minors playing violent video games and actual
psychological harm. 
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The State relies heavily on the work of Dr. Craig Anderson,
pointing to Dr. Anderson’s 2004 updated meta-analysis called
An update on the effects of playing violent video games.16
Craig A. Anderson, An update on the effects of playing violent
video games, 27 J. ADOLESCENCE 113 (2004). This article
states that it “reveals that exposure to violent video games is
significantly linked to increases in aggressive behaviour,
aggressive cognition, aggressive affect, and cardiovascular
arousal, and to decreases in helping behaviour.” Even upon
lay review, however, the disclaimers in this article, alone, sig-
nificantly undermine the inferences drawn by the State in sup-
port of its psychological harm rationale.17 First, Dr. Anderson
remarks on the relative paucity of the video game literature
and concedes that the violent video game literature is not suf-
ficiently large to conduct a detailed meta-analysis of the spe-
cific methodological features of other studies, many of which
were themselves flawed. Second, he further states that
“[t]here is not a large enough body of samples . . . for truly
sensitive tests of potential age difference in susceptibility to
violent video game effects,” and jettisons mid-article his
exploration of the effect of age differences (i.e., over-eighteen
versus under-eighteen). It appears that he abandoned the age
aspect of the study, in part, because “there was a hint that the
aggressive behaviour results might be slightly larger for the
18 and over group.” He concludes the meta-analysis with the
admission that there is a “glaring empirical gap” in video
game violence research due to “the lack of longitudinal
studies.” 
16Meta-analysis is “a quantitative method for integrating existing
studies” where “statistical procedures are used to assess the magnitude of
a phenomenon across different studies, independent of the studies’ sample
sizes.” David L. Faigman et al., 2 MOD. SCI. EVIDENCE § 18:13 (2005-06
Ed.). 
17Dr. Anderson’s hearing testimony in the Blagojevich case, which is in
the record, contains his assent to the statements that there is probably an
“infinite” number of stimuli that could cause aggression or aggressive
thoughts in a person (e.g., a picture of a gun), and that his selection of vio-
lent video games was “largely a matter of [his] choice.” 
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Thus, Dr. Anderson’s research has readily admitted flaws
that undermine its support of the State’s interest in regulating
video games sales and rentals to minors, perhaps most impor-
tantly its retreat from the study of the psychological effects of
video games as related to the age of the person studied.18
Although not dispositive of this case, we note that other
courts have either rejected Dr. Anderson’s research or found
it insufficient to establish a causal link between violence in
video games and psychological harm. See Kendrick, 244 F.3d
at 578; Granholm, 426 F. Supp. 2d at 653; Entm’t Software
Ass’n v. Hatch, 443 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1069 & n.1 (D. Minn.
2006); Blagojevich, 404 F. Supp. 2d at 1063. 
The State also relies on a study of the effects of video game
violence on adolescents, conducted by Dr. Douglas Gentile,
which studied eighth and ninth graders and concluded that
“[a]dolescents who expose themselves to greater amounts of
video game violence were more hostile” and reported getting
into more arguments and fights and performing poorly in
school. Douglas A. Gentile et al., The effects of violent video
game habits on adolescent hostility, aggressive behaviors,
and school performance, 27 J. ADOLESCENCE 5 (2004). The
extent to which this study supports the State’s position is sus-
pect for similar reasons as Dr. Anderson’s work. First, this
study states that due to its “correlational nature” it could not
directly answer the following question: “Are young adoles-
cents more hostile and aggressive because they expose them-
selves to media violence, or do previously hostile adolescents
prefer violent media?” Second, this study largely relates to the
player’s violent or aggressive behavior toward others—which,
18The State also relies on a 2003 study on general media violence by Dr.
Anderson, which contains a three-page section on violent video games and
reflects the conclusions and shortfalls of the 2004 meta-analysis. Craig A.
Anderson et al., The Influence of Media Violence on Youth, 4
PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST 81, 90-93 (2003). For
example, the study states that “[t]here are no published longitudinal sur-
veys specifically focusing on effects of violent video games on aggres-
sion.” 
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as noted above, is not the interest relied on by the State here
—rather than the psychological or neurological harm to the
player. Moreover, the study glaringly states that “[i]t is impor-
tant to note . . . that this study is limited by its correlational
nature. Inferences about causal direction should be viewed
with caution” (emphasis added). Finally, Dr. Gentile’s study
suggests that “[a]dditional experimental and longitudinal
research is needed.” 
Additionally, the State relies on a study by Dr. Jeanne Funk
for the proposition that video games can lead to desensitiza-
tion to violence in minors. Jeanne B. Funk et al., Violence
exposure in real-life, video games, television, movies, and the
internet: is there desensitization?, 27 J. ADOLESCENCE 23
(2004). Like the others, this study presents only an attenuated
path between video game violence and desensitization. It spe-
cifically disclaims that it is based on correlation principles
and that “causality was not studied.”  
Finally, the State relies on a two-page press release from
Indiana University regarding the purported connection
between violent video games and altered brain activity in the
frontal lobe. Press Release, Indiana University School of
Medicine, Aggressive Youths, Violent Video Games Trigger
Unusual Brain Activity (Dec. 2, 2002). The research
described, conducted in part by Dr. Kronenberger, has been
criticized by courts that have reviewed it in depth. See Blago-
jevich, 404 F. Supp. 2d at 1063-65 (“Dr. Kronenberger con-
ceded that his studies only demonstrate a correlative, not a
causal, relationship between high media violence exposure
and children who experience behavioral disorders [or]
decreased brain activity . . . .” ); Granholm, 426 F. Supp. 2d
at 653 (“Dr. Kronenberger’s research not only fails to provide
concrete evidence that there is a connection between violent
media and aggressive behavior, it also fails to distinguish
between video games and other forms of media.”). 
[13] In sum, the evidence presented by the State does not
support the Legislature’s purported interest in preventing psy-
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chological or neurological harm. Nearly all of the research is
based on correlation, not evidence of causation, and most of
the studies suffer from significant, admitted flaws in method-
ology as they relate to the State’s claimed interest. None of
the research establishes or suggests a causal link between
minors playing violent video games and actual psychological
or neurological harm, and inferences to that effect would not
be reasonable. In fact, some of the studies caution against
inferring causation. Although we do not require the State to
demonstrate a “scientific certainty,” the State must come for-
ward with more than it has. As a result, the State has not met
its burden to demonstrate a compelling interest.
B.
Even if we assume that the State demonstrated a compel-
ling interest in preventing psychological or neurological harm,
the State still has the burden of demonstrating that the Act is
narrowly tailored to further that interest, and that there are no
less restrictive alternatives that would further the Act. Play-
boy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. at 813. We hold that the
State has not demonstrated that less restrictive alternative
means are not available. 
Instead of focusing its argument on the possibility of less
restrictive means, the State obscures the analysis by focusing
on the “most effective” means, which it asserts is the one
thousand dollar penalty imposed for each violation. Specifi-
cally, the State argues that the ESRB rating system, a volun-
tary system without the force of law or civil penalty, is not a
less-restrictive alternative means of furthering the Legisla-
ture’s purported compelling interest. Acknowledging that the
industry has implemented new enforcement mechanisms, the
State nevertheless argues that the ESRB does not adequately
prevent minors from purchasing M-rated games.  The State
also dismisses the notion that parental controls on modern
gaming systems could serve the government’s purposes, argu-
ing that there is no evidence that this technology existed at the
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time the Act was passed. But see Foti, 451 F. Supp. 2d at 833
(suggesting that such controls could be a less-restrictive mea-
sure); cf. Reno, 521 U.S. at 876-77 (finding relevant the fact
that a reasonably effective method by which parents could
prevent children from accessing internet material which par-
ents believed to be inappropriate “will soon be widely avail-
able”). 
Further, the State does not acknowledge the possibility that
an enhanced education campaign about the ESRB rating sys-
tem directed at retailers and parents would help achieve gov-
ernment interests. See also Playboy, 529 U.S. at 816 (“When
a plausible, less restrictive alternative is offered to a content-
based speech restriction, it is the Government’s obligation to
prove that the alternative will be ineffective to achieve its
goals.”); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484,
507-08 (1996) (plurality op.) (striking down ban on advertis-
ing alcohol prices because of less restrictive alternatives, such
as an educational campaign or counter-speech). The State
appears to be singularly focused on the “most effective” way
to further its goal, instead of the “least restrictive means,” and
has not shown why the less-restrictive means would be inef-
fective. 
[14] Even assuming that the State’s interests in enacting the
Act are sufficient, the State has not demonstrated why less
restrictive means would not forward its interests. The Act,
therefore, is not narrowly tailored. Based on the foregoing,
and in light of the presumptive invalidity of content-based
restrictions, we conclude that the Act fails under strict scru-
tiny review.
VI.
Finally, we evaluate the constitutionality of the Act’s label-
ing provision, which requires that the front side of the pack-
age of a “violent video game” be labeled with a four square-
inch label that reads “18.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1746.2. Plaintiffs
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argue that section 1746.2 unconstitutionally forces video
game retailers to carry the State of California’s subjective
opinion, a message with which it disagrees. The State count-
ers that the “labeling provision impacts the purely commercial
aspect regarding retail sales of the covered video games” and,
under the resulting rational basis analysis, the labeling
requirement is rationally related to the State’s “self-evident
purpose of communicating to consumers and store clerks that
the video game cannot be legally purchased by anyone under
18 years of age.” 
[15] Generally, “freedom of speech prohibits the govern-
ment from telling people what they must say.” Rumsfeld v.
Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47,
61 (2006); see also United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533
U.S. 405, 410 (2001); Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 487
U.S. 781, 795 (1988). Commercial speech, however, is gener-
ally accorded less protection than other expression. See
United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. at 409. The Court has upheld
compelled commercial speech where the state required inclu-
sion of “purely factual and uncontroversial information” in
advertising. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel,
471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) (upholding state’s requirement that
attorney include in his advertisements a disclosure that clients
may be responsible for litigation costs); see also United States
v. Schiff, 379 F.3d 621, 630-31 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that
the government could compel website operator to post factual
information about potential criminal liability if patrons used
website to evade taxes); Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272
F.3d 104, 113-15 (2d Cir. 2001) (upholding state labeling law
that required manufacturers of mercury-containing products to
disclose on packaging factual and uncontroversial information
about the disposal of mercury-containing products). Com-
pelled disclosures, justified by the need to “dissipate the pos-
sibility of consumer confusion or deception,” are permissible
if the “disclosure requirements are reasonably related to the
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State’s interest in preventing deception of customers.”
Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651.19 
[16] Ordinarily, we would initially decide whether video
game packaging constitutes separable commercial speech or
commercial speech that is “inextricably intertwined” with oth-
erwise fully-protected speech. See Riley, 487 U.S. at 795-96
(stating that “[i]t is not clear that . . . speech is necessarily
commercial whenever it relates to [a] person’s financial moti-
vation for speaking”). That analysis would direct what level
of scrutiny to apply to the labeling requirement. However, we
need not decide that question because the labeling require-
ment fails even under the factual information and deception
prevention standards set forth in Zauderer.20 Our holding
above, that the Act’s sale and rental prohibition is unconstitu-
tional, negates the State’s argument that the labeling provision
only requires that video game retailers carry “purely factual
and uncontroversial information” in advertising. Zauderer,
471 U.S. at 651. Unless the Act can clearly and legally char-
acterize a video game as “violent” and not subject to First
Amendment protections, the “18” sticker does not convey fac-
tual information. 
19Heightened scrutiny may apply, however, if the commercial speech is
“inextricably intertwined” with otherwise fully-protected speech, e.g.,
political speech, charitable solicitations. Riley, 487 U.S. at 796; Cal-
Almond, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 14 F.3d 429, 436 (9th Cir. 1993). 
20We note that on similar facts, the Seventh Circuit, in Entertainment
Software Association v. Blagojevich, struck down a statute’s requirement
that video game retailers affix a four square-inch sticker reading “18” on
any video game the state defined as “sexually explicit.” 469 F.3d 641,
651-52 (7th Cir. 2006). The court applied strict scrutiny because, in its
view, the label did not concern the disclosure of “purely factual”
information—the label reflected the state’s opinion that the product con-
tained material that the state deemed “sexually explicit” and communi-
cated a “subjective and highly controversial message.” Id. at 652. We do
not adopt the Blagojevich court’s approach here because it is not clear
what authority supported its application of strict scrutiny, and we conclude
that the labeling requirement here is invalid under a less-strict review stan-
dard. 
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Moreover, the labeling requirement fails Zauderer’s ratio-
nal relationship test, which asks if the “disclosure require-
ments are reasonably related to the State’s interest in
preventing deception of customers.” Id. at 651. Our determi-
nation that the Act is unconstitutional eliminates the alleged
deception that the State’s labeling requirement would purport-
edly prevent: the misleading of consumers and retailers by the
ESRB age ratings that already appear on the video games’
packaging. Since the Act is invalid and, as a result, there is
no state-mandated age threshold for the purchase or rental of
video games, there is no chance for deception based on the
possibly conflicting ESRB rating labels. In fact, the State’s
mandated label would arguably now convey a false statement
that certain conduct is illegal when it is not, and the State has
no legitimate reason to force retailers to affix false informa-
tion on their products. See Hatch, 443 F. Supp. 2d at 1072,
aff’d on other grounds, Swanson, 519 F.3d 768.
VII.
We decline the State’s invitation to apply the variable
obscenity standard from Ginsberg to the Act because we do
not read Ginsberg as reaching beyond the context of restric-
tions on sexually-explicit materials or as creating an entirely
new category of expression—speech as to minors—excepted
from First Amendment protections. As the Act is a content
based regulation, it is subject to strict scrutiny and is pre-
sumptively invalid. Under strict scrutiny, the State has not
produced substantial evidence that supports the Legislature’s
conclusion that violent video games cause psychological or
neurological harm to minors. Even if it did, the Act is not nar-
rowly tailored to prevent that harm and there remain less-
restrictive means of forwarding the State’s purported interests,
such as the improved ESRB rating system, enhanced educa-
tional campaigns, and parental controls. Finally, even if the
Act’s labeling requirement affects only commercial speech in
the form of video game packaging, that provision constitutes
impermissibly compelled speech because the compelled label
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would not convey purely factual information. Accordingly,
the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Plaintiffs
and denial of the State’s cross-motion for summary judgment
is AFFIRMED. 
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Overview 
To rhe creative, technological, managerial, and fi nancial layers o f vid eo game study 
add another: the law of intellectual property. Where a player see5 5camle~ on-screen 
imeractive gamepby, :md a developer sees original characters, artwork, backgrounds, 
storylines, dialogue, music, and sounds brought to life by software game engines and 
tools, a h ."'0'er sees an amalgam of patents, c.opyrights, publicity rights, moral rights, 
trademarks, and trade secrets. To an increa.~ing eXlent, video game dc\·dop mellt 
choices, and uhiman:ly what appears on the player's screen, are shaped by the web of 
rights and remedies the legal system colle<:ts under the he::ading of intell ectual prop-
erty. Intellectual property often is abbreviated IP, and thai designation will be used her.: . 
A working definition of intellectual property is the bundle of rights [0 the intan-
~ible creations and inventions of the hum:m intellecr. 
It is useful to think of II' rights as a bundle bec.1use it is possible W 5Uudividc ribhrs 
based on factors such as use, duration. exclusivity, tr.msfer:abiiity, and geographic scope. 
fr rights have complementary pates: the right to exploi( and the right to conuol 
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exploitatio n by others. For example, ;} developer's righ r to preVent Others from repro-
ducing a game is flmdamental to the devdoper's right to be co mpensated for the 
assignment of the game Ir to a publisher. IP is inrangible. IP is not (he book or CD, 
bur rather ownership [ights to lhe wl'itten expression contained in the book or audio-
visual recording on the CD. A book and CD can be physically possessed ;md have a 
finil e: presence . The written expression or audioYISult recordi n ~ can be perceived 
throug.h an expandi ng array of technology, including the Internet. Consequcndy, they 
can have virtually limitless presenCe. Th is combin:l. rion of fac rors. (he in tangible 
nature of IP riglllS and [C~ch no logic3 1 adv .. ncc.~ III IP re production and disrribm ion , 
present the great challenge ( 0 (he en force mcn l ofJ P r igh[~ (oday. 
T he al locarion and enforcemel\( of II> fights is governed by na lional and some-
times local laws, government agencies, and international u eaties chat pertain to patents, 
copyrights, rrademarks, and trade se ":fe l ~. The,e law" prilm.rily the II' law, of the 
United States, arc the focus of this chapter. The emphasis wili be on video game IP 
However, the "3.ppliC3ti on of these laws e:l(tends fa r wider, to all m:lnll er of Kientific, 
tech nological, literary, artistic, :lI1d comm ercial crea ,ions, discoveries, and inven tio ns. 
This chapter IS a distillarion of what li re complex and evolving I P laws and prin-
ciples. It should be nmed rh:lt the description of parllcular laws and principles Illay be 
subject to ullstated qualifi cu iom or omissions. IP laws and principles can and do 
change and can vary ~ ignifican dy among d ilTw~1ll jur i,diniu llS. T h is (.hapu:r due.s not 
constitute legal advice, which should be obtained through consulta tion with an attor-
ney in the Context of specific f;l Cts . 
Categories of IP Protection 
If wi ll be useful to Han with .Ul imroducrlo n to the prin ciples tha t govern the major 
fo rms of lP prorection and to consider thei r in terrdat ion. 
A p.uenr protects certain novel, useful, and nonobvious invent ions having a urili -
t:u i3n funct io n. 
The owner of a Uni ted Sra te.~ p3te m has righ rs superior to a..i l subst:qllenr inven-
tors, hut for a limited term that is curren tly 20 years. Rights 10 an invemio n arc not 
protected from use by others unless a patem is obtained from th e Un ited States Patent 
and Trademark O ffice (USPTO). III exchange for the monopoly IP rights gramed to 
the patentee during rhe patent term, the patentee must make a full publi c disclosure 
of the invention in (he patent. T hi s disclos ure may be fred y exploited by anyone once 
the p:ltent exp ires. Patents perme:ne the hardware technology o n wh ich video games 
arc pl:1yed. So-called method pa ren r.~ are med (Q secure a monopoly in particular 
forms of gameplay or softw3re functionali ty, although as b u:r di.~cussed such method 
p;l(entS are the subject of increasing criticism 3nd judicial limi t3t ion. 
Unlike ·the 20-year term of parents, exclusive IP rights to an invent ion, diKov~ry, 
or other co nfidential and commercially val uable information can be ma intained indef-
initdy as a trade secret. The owner of a trade secret can preclude others frum disclosing 
nonpublic information obtained from fhe owner. However, un like a patent holder, 
• 
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the owner of a trJ.de secret cannot SlOp independenr discovery and usc of such infor-
mat io n. A palen( docs nOI prolcct ideas, onl}' (he funct ional embodiment or imple-
mentation of an id('a in a m:w and u~fu l device or method. A u-adc seeTel can be used 
ro protect the idea itself from use by others. T he protection accorded u ade secrets is :l 
matter offederal and indi yiduai s t:HC laws, the latter of which 011:('0 arc modeled upon 
the Uniform Trade Secrets Act. 
A copyright protects creative exp ress ion in any fixed medium such as books, film, 
C Ds, vidcocape, records, and computer hard drives. M wieh patents, copyrights do 
not prOtect ideas, only their expression. This limitation applies to so-called sunt! a 
'foin.- scock literary devices like plots, incidents, ~eenes, and characters. In the field of 
video games, this concept is captured in the term "genre." It enables such similar 
games as Strut Fighter, Virtud Fighta, and Mortn! Kombtlt 10 coexist witham copy-
right infringmlcm. Copyright protects against only actual copying; therefore, another 
person can cl'}im rights to identical expression so long a.~ it was not copied. 
Theoretically, two people working without knowledge of each other could paint the 
sam e pictu re, write the same software, or take the same phorograph. E.'lch could copy-
right their creative work. The concept of copyright "expression" does not include 
individual words, names, or titl es. Hence , !he ti de of a vid eo game sllch as Halo can-
not be copyrighted. However, it may be trademarked jf it servC.'i to jdentify the source 
of th l: gaml: to t:onsumers. T he dur:uion of:l copyright curre-nlly is the life of the 
am hor/ani:>! plu.~ seventy years, or a fixed period , a.~ discussed below, fo r anonymous 
or corpo rate authors. It is no t necessary to register a copyright, al though impon anr 
enfo rcement bcncfi l.~ are conferred by doing so. Copyright rcgisnmion is the statUlory 
responsibility of the United States Libr;lry of Congress. 
A trade mark or mark is any word, symbol or device that se rves to identify the 
source or origin of particlllar goods or se rvices. INSOMNIAC G AMES, GRAND 
THEFT AUTO and PLAYSTATION are examples offamous word marks ofTnsomniac 
Games, [nc., Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc., and Sony Computer Entertainment 
Inc., respectively. Sega Corporation's classic "Sonic the Hedgehog" graphic character 
design and Nintcndo of America Inc.'s equally famous "Mario the Plumber" graphi<: 
character design are examples of widely recognized des ign trademarks. The white 
and red stylized GAMESTOP lettering is a combined word and dlo:sign mark of 
Gamescop, Inc. The nonfunctional trade dress o f" a product-the product's "total 
image"_ is also capable of serving as a trademark. An example is the case dl:sign of the 
Microsoft Xbox 360. Unlike a copyright, a trademark can bl: obtain ed for a word or 
ride, as long as rhe word or title signifies the source of thl: product or service. For 
example, the words "star wars" and "Harry Pa lter" cannot be copyrighted as th e title 
of a single book or film, but they em serve as a trademark for a series ofbooh or films 
and fo r m l:fchandise related. to {he book Of film !lute o riginates from one soutce. 
Moreover, {he creative content o f the 51llr Wars and !larry PotUr slOries, including the 
text or screenplay and such su1x:omponcnrs as character~, costumes, dialogue, scenes, and 
plot, is protcl.: table by copyright. Ownership of;:t tr:tdemark is eslablished by first usc . 
• 
~.:9:B,-_____________ -,-P~a"rt"-,7_Game Productlo_n_a_n_d_~t~~e_Bus~n~e~~ of Games 
It is not necessary to register a trademark to secure exdusive rights but, as with a copy-
right, registration confers significanr benefits. The USPTO n:gisters trademarks, as do 
the individual states. The federal trademark law is known as the Lanham Act. The 
duration of a trademark potenrially is perpetual. It lasts as long as it is in use [0 iden-
tify the source of goods or services. A federally registered trademark is renewable every 
10 years as long as the: mark continues in use in imerstate commerce. 
The foregoing IP categories are by no means mutually exclusive. Take, for example, 
a game controller named the \XfIGLI with an unusually sculpted design that incorpo-
rates a novel motion sensor. WIGLI serves as a trademark identifYing the controller 
creator as the seller. The \XfIGLI crea[Or also may be able to claim copyright protec-
tion in the controller's shape as a sculpture, apply for a design patent ro protect the 
ornamental features of the controller, and apply for a unlity patent on the motion 
sensor invention. Over time, if the public associates the controller's distinctive deSign 
with the source of the controller, as the public has come to associate the curved shape 
of the Coca-Cola glass bottle with cola originating from Coca-Cob Company, then 
the controller's shape could be claimed separately as a trademark This IP overlap is 
well illustrated in the context of video games. 
The IP Content of Video Games 
The typical video game is protected by an umbrella of patents, copyrights, trade-
marks, and trade secrets that may be owned by differellt parties. Because copyright 
covers creative expression fIxed ill a tangible medium, it is the most prevalent form of 
IP protection in video games. Software in the form of game engines and tools, 5Oft-
ware documentation, artwork, stotyline, backgrounds, characters, costumes, 
weapons, dialogue, text, sound effects, and music are among the forms of copy-
rightable expression found in games. Copyright ownership originates with (he author 
or cteatot. This can be the employee who draws the art\vork or an independent con-
tractor who scores the music. Under "work-for-hire" principles later discussed, 
employee contributions normally become the property of the employer by operation 
of law. Independent contractors generally must assign their fights in a written agree-
ment to the party who commissions rhe work. Copyrights are subject to transfer by 
assignment or license. An assignmem conveys all rights to the copyrighted IP. A 
license conveys less than all of such rights; for example, the nonexclusive, nontransfer-
able, perpetual right to sel! the copyrighted work throughout North America. 
Independent developers typically assign rights to those portions of the game that are 
experienced by a player to the publisher that funds development of the game. They 
grant an irrevocable and nonexclusive license to the publisher for the software that 
enables the game to run. The game may be based on a copyright license, such as when 
a film, book, or comic is made into a video game. 
Patents may apply to the technology embodied in the hardware on which the 
game is played, on the media (diskette, CD, cartridge, bard drive) on which the game 
is recorded, and on software that enables the game to perfurm particular functions. 
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Hardware patents are owned or licensed by the manufacmrer, who also may be the 
publisher, in the case of Sony, Microsoft, and Nintendo, and at timl':s also thl': devd-
opl':r of the gaml':. Because patl':nts are expensivl': to acquirl': and to enforcl':, thl':)' all': 
tardy sought by indl':pendent devdopl':fs. 
Video games also providl': a fertile environment for trademarks. The publisher 
and devdoper of thl': game, oftl':ll sl':parate parril':s, may each rradl':mark thl':ir businl':ss 
naml': as a word mark and may crl':ate a design such as fanciful lettering or a graphic as 
a further source of their identification. The tide of rhe game may be the separate sub-
ject of trademark protection. If a particular feature of the game also acts as a designa-
tion of the source of the game, it may function as a trademark.1u already mentioned, 
Sega's adoption of Sonic the Hedgehog as its corporate mascot, Nintl':ndo's similar dis-
play of Mario the Plumber. and Sony's de focta use of Crash Bandicoot as its mascot in 
connection with the original PlayStation games, have served as widdy recognized 
brands of these companies. 
Lastly, confidential aspects of the know-how used to program the game, budgets 
and financial statements, and thl': terms of the agreements between the devdoper and 
its publisher, its employees, and its independent contractors, may be secured from use 
by others as trade secrets. Prior to [he release of a much anticipated game to the pub-
lic, the entire contents of rhe game may be maintained as a trade secret to build inter-
est and thwart simultaneous-rdease knockoffs. 
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Instead of legislation, Congress should let the courts
continue to resolve the patent crisis.
Courts and the
Patent System
BY DAN L. BURK
University of California, Irvine
AND MARK A. LEMLEY
Stanford Law School
he patent system is in crisis. The consen-
sus in favor of strong patent protection
that has existed since the 1982 creation of
the Federal Circuit (the appeals court that
hears virtually all patent disputes in the
United States) has broken down. Patent
owners — and the Federal Circuit itself —
are beset on all sides by those complaining about the prolif-
eration of bad patents and the abuse of those patents in
court. Critics point to example after example: silly patents
granted by the Patent and Trademark Office (pto), lawsuits
filed by people who invented something decades ago against
companies who do something very different today, patent
claims so confusing that no one can be sure what the patent
covers, and so on.
But the patent system described above — the one in crisis
— is not the only patent system in the United States. There is
another system in which claims are clear, patents are subject
to significant scrutiny, and strong protection is necessary to
allow companies to recover hundreds ofmillions of dollars in
investment. The prototypical industry that operates in this sec-
ond patent system is the pharmaceutical industry, but other
industries, including medical devices and chemistry, look
more like this as well.
Talk to lawyers or businesspeople at technology companies
about the patent system and youwill quickly get a sense of our
two different patent systems. In the pharmaceutical industry,
there seems to be a strong consensus (at least among inno-
T
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This article is excerpted from their new book, The Patent Crisis and How the
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vative rather than generic pharmaceutical companies) that
patents are critical to innovation. Their only complaint is that
patents aren’t strong enough. They don’t last long enough to
compensate for delays in the drug approval process, and the
uncertain or probabilistic nature of patent scope and validi-
ty leaves themwith uncertain protection for their enormous
investment.
Lawyers and executives in the information technology (IT)
industries, by contrast, almost invariably see the patent sys-
tem as a cost rather than a benefit to innovation. Even IT com-
panies with tens of thousands of patents generally use those
patents only “defensively,” to minimize the amount they
must pay other patent owners to permit them to sell their
products. Ask most of those companies, and in their candid
moments they will tell you that they would be better off
without any patent system, or at least with one that was rad-
ically changed and that left them alone to innovate.
INNOVATION DIFFERENCES
Any doubts that the patent system is perceived by different
industries in fundamentally different ways were dispelled
during the past five years of congressional debate over patent
reform. Different industries calling for reform couldn’t agree
on a single principle of reform. The pharmaceutical and
biotech industries wanted harmonization on first-to-file, the
elimination of the best-mode requirement, and the weaken-
ing of rules against inequitable conduct, but those changes
were opposed by the IT industry. The IT industry wanted
reforms to limit damages and injunctive relief in patent
holdup settings and an effective administrative process to
oppose patents, but those reforms were opposed by the bio-
medical industries.
In the last 20 years, legal and economic scholarship has pro-
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vided valuable evidence about the complex process of inno-
vation and how the patent system affects innovation. Rather
than resolve the debate over howwell the patent systemworks,
however, this evidence has painted a more complex picture.
Different industries vary greatly in how they approach inno-
vation, the cost of innovation, and the importance of inno-
vation to continued growth.One size definitely does not fit all.
This observation is graphically illustrated by examples from
several industries, whose characteristics we sketch here.
First, the cost of research and development varies widely
from industry to industry and from innovation to innovation.
In the pharmaceutical industry, for example, the research
and development, drug design, and testing of a new drug can
take a decade or more and cost, on average, hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars. Some—probablymost — of this cost is a result
of the labyrinthine regulatory process and the detailed study
that is required to determine that a drug is safe and effective
for humans so the Food and Drug Administration will
approve it. Amajor additional part of the cost stems from the
uncertainty of the research and development efforts.
Pharmaceutical companies may try hundreds of compounds
before identifying a possible drug, and theymay not know for
years whether they have chosen the right one for testing.
Drug companies need some way to get a return on that sig-
nificant investment.
Another example of an industry where invention requires
significant investment is semiconductors. Asmicroprocessors
have gotten smaller, their design as well as the facilities and
processes used to create themhave grown exponentiallymore
complex. Building a new microprocessor requires not only
painstaking work on circuit design —work that can cost tens
of millions of dollars — but also the design and construction
of an entirely new fabrication process in a new facility. The
need for both highly skilled labor and a dedicated physical
plant makes microprocessor development highly resource-
intensive. Ultimately, the design of a new generation ofmicro-
processors takes years of planning and construction and can
cost more than $4 billion.
By contrast, other industries require significantly less invest-
ment in research and development. In the software industry,
for example, it has long been possible for two programmers
working in a garage to develop a commercial software program.
The cost of writing code has gone up in recent years, particu-
larly for operating systems. Operating systems tend to be
more complex than applications programs because operating
systemsmust bewritten to run a variety of computer programs
and control various hardware devices. But it is still possible in
many cases to hire a teamof programmers towrite a new appli-
cations program for less than $1million. Although debugging
a new program is still a significant undertaking, writing such
a program takes considerably less time than developing a new
drug or producing a microprocessor.
Further, in software andmany other industries, particularly
biotechnology and the manufacture of machines and con-
sumer products, much of the innovation process has been
automated in the last 15 years. Although computer-assisted
design and manufacturing tools do not replace the need for
innovative ideas, they make the process of prototyping and
testing those ideas much easier and faster. Similarly, power-
ful bioinformatics databases and the development of mass-
production techniques like polymerase chain reaction have
revolutionized the biotechnology industry, making the iden-
tification of gene sequences and the development of related
therapies much cheaper and quicker than they were in pre-
ceding decades. The use of automated tools that actually
generate sections of code to help design simple programs such
as websites has made computer programming simpler. The
result of this automation is that industries in which tradi-
tional innovation was largely an iterative process of optimiz-
ing prototypes today require less research and development
expenditure than those that require either live testing or a new
manufacturing process.
Economic evidence has also shown industry-specific vari-
ation in the corporate nature of innovation. The prototypical
innovation contemplated by the patent law is made by an
individual inventor working in his garage after hours. But
innovation inmost industries today is generally collaborative
andmuch of it requires large laboratories. The overwhelming
majority of patents today are granted to large corporations, and
even those granted to individuals and small corporations are
often incubated in large research universities. The role of indi-
vidual inventors is much greater in some industries, such as
mechanics and software, than in others, such as biotechnol-
ogy and semiconductors. And not surprisingly, corporate
innovation tends to costmore than innovation by individuals.
DIFFERENCES IN PATENTING PRACTICE
The systematic variation in research and development expen-
ditures across industries naturally affects the need for patent
protection. Industries thatmust spendmore time andmoney
in research and development generally have a greater need for
patent protection in order to recoup that investment. That
doesn’t mean that the patent system has no place for cheap-
er inventions; patentsmay still facilitate market transactions
in new innovations. But certain industries have a stronger
claim than others to need the incentives patents provide.
The effective scope of patents that do issue also varies
tremendously by industry. This variance results from the
relationship between a patent and a product. Much conven-
tional wisdom in the patent system is built on the unstated
assumption of a one-to-one correspondence in which a sin-
gle patent covers a single product. For example, we speak of
patents covering products: in common parlance, Eli Whitney
patented the cotton gin, Thomas Edison patented the light
bulb, Alexander GrahamBell patented the telephone, and the
Wright brothers patented the airplane. Modern patent law
also assumes such a one-for-one correspondence in its deci-
sion to measure damages by the profits lost in the sale of
infringing products.
However, such a correspondence is the exception rather
than the rule in the modern economy. Machines of even
moderate complexity are composed ofmany different pieces,
and each of those components can itself be the subject of one
or more patents. No inventor could patent a modern car, for
instance. Rather, he would be required to patent a particular
invention — say, intermittent windshield wipers — that is
only one small piece of a much larger product. This corre-
spondencemay have been overstated even in the classic inven-
tions mentioned in the last paragraph: the Wright brothers
did not in fact patent an aircraft; their patent actually covered
the use of a vertical rudder and a fixed wing (the “aero-
plane”). Edison’s patent was an improvement on an existing
light bulb that claimed a particular class of incandescent fil-
aments. Still, the traditional mechanical nature of invention
was more susceptible to the one patent–one product corre-
spondence than the more complex modern environment.
The strength of this correspondence varies by industry. In
some industries such as chemistry and pharmaceuticals, a sin-
gle patent normally covers a single product — a new chemi-
cal or a new use for that chemical. In industries such as semi-
conductors, by contrast, new products are so complex that
they can incorporate hundreds and even thousands of dif-
ferent inventions — inventions frequently patented by differ-
ent companies. A patent covering one of those hundreds of
components will not effectively protect the product; it is use-
ful, if at all, only as a licensing tool. Further, this difference
means that we cannot simply apply the remedy rules fromone
industry to patents in another; if damages are calculated cor-
rectly, patents in the semiconductor industry will tend to
generate much lower royalty rates than in the single-patent
product industries. Mark Lemley and Carl Shapiro, in a 2007
Texas Law Review paper, offer evidence that courts do not
fully take these differences into account, but they still find
industry-specific variation in royalty rates. Still other indus-
tries fall somewhere in between. Products in biotechnology or
software may require the integration of several different
patents, but not hundreds of them. The correspondence
between patents and products obviously affects the signifi-
cance of patents in protecting research and development.
Industries differ in the importance of continued innova-
tion. Innovation is, in general, socially valuable. In many
industries, especially young ones, innovation is critical to
welfare. But innovation works very differently in different
industries. In some industries, notably pharmaceuticals, inno-
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obviousness standard found in § 103 of the patent statute.
Although originally developed as a common law doctrine, the
non-obviousness criterionwas codified in the 1952 Patent Act
as a requirement that the claimed invention taken as a whole
not be obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time
the inventionwasmade. The phosita is equally central to cal-
ibrating the legal standard for patent disclosure. In return for
a period of exclusive rights over an invention, the inventor
must fully disclose the invention to the public. The first
paragraph of § 112 requires that this disclosure enable “any
person skilled in the art” tomake and use the claimed inven-
tion. This same standard controls several other disclosure doc-
trines as well. First, the definition of enablement affects the
patentability requirement of specific utility, as the invention
must actually work as described in the specification if the
inventor is to enable one of ordinary skill to use it.
As the name suggests, phosita-based analysis is specific
to the particular art in which the invention is made. Courts
measure most significant patent law doctrines against a
benchmark that varies by industry, and within industry by
technology. If the court concludes that an art is uncertain and
its practitioners are not particularly skilled, it will be inclined
to find even relatively modest improvements non-obvious to
the phosita. At the same time, the court will be inclined to
require greater disclosure to satisfy the requirements of §
112, and correspondingly to narrow the scope of claims per-
missible from any given disclosure. If the art is predictable and
the phosita quite skilled, the reverse is also true. The result
is to make the phosita a potentially significant macro pol-
icy lever, awarding many narrow patents to some industries
and a few broader patents to other industries.
There is overwhelming evidence that the application of the
phosita standard varies by industry, leading for example to
fewer but broader valid software patents, and more but nar-
rower biotechnology patents. It is less clear that the court is
in fact using the phosita explicitly as a policy lever, respond-
ing to the characteristics of particular industries, rather
than merely trying to predict what those of skill in the art
would think.
In 2007, the Supreme Court changed the standard of obvi-
ousness in theKSR case. Rather than focus on the existence of
awritten suggestion in the prior art, theCourt said, the test for
obviousness must focus on the knowledge and abilities of the
phosita, includingwhatever creative or innovative tendencies
the ordinary scientist in the field possessed. In one fell swoop,
the Court turned obviousness from a search for written sug-
gestions in the prior art, regardless of industry, to a question
ofwhat the phosita in a particular fieldwould knowor could
figure out. In so doing,KSR gave courts the power to use obvi-
ousness doctrine as a whole as a case-by-case policy lever, one
that will lead to more valid patents in industries in which the
phositaknows little or is uncreative, andmore invalid patents
in industries with more sophisticated players.
EMERGING POLICY LEVERS
Patent rights are exclusive rights that fit the classic formu-
lation of a “property rule.” Indeed, the patent right to exclude
vation tends to be a stand-alone process generating a single
finished product. Once a drug is developed and tested, it
tends not to be improved. At most, pharmaceutical compa-
nies will improve the delivery system or patent obvious chem-
ical variants such as metabolites. By contrast, in computer
software, cumulative innovation is extraordinarily impor-
tant. It is received wisdom among software consumers that
you shouldn’t buy version 1.0 of any program. The expecta-
tion is that the programs will be incrementally improved
over time. These differences in innovation have great signif-
icance for patent policy because they bear on the importance
we should attach to pioneer innovation in various sectors as
opposed to continuing improvement.
The relationship between patents and innovation is at
least as complex as the profile of technological and econom-
ic factors that determine innovation. There is no simple or uni-
versal correlation between the availability of patents and the
incentive to innovate. Indeed, as the American Enterprise
Institute’s Bob Hahn has put it, “the most general lesson to
be gleaned from the patent literature is that there are few gen-
eral lessons.” This is due in part to the fact that the patent sys-
tem interacts with industries at several different points in the
innovation process. Recent evidence has demonstrated that
this complex relationship is industry-specific at each stage of
the patent process: deciding to seek protection, obtaining a
patent, setting the scope of a patent, deciding to enforce a
patent, and determining litigation outcomes.
Rewriting the patent law for each industry would involve
substantial administrative costs and uncertainty. Congress
would have to write new statutes not just for biotechnology
and software, but for numerous different industries with
special characteristics. Semiconductors, pharmaceuticals,
chemicals, nanotechnology, telecommunications, and other
industries would all need separate statutes. Past experience
with such specialized statutes is also not encouraging. The his-
tory of industry-specific statutes suggests that many fail
because they are drafted with then-current technology in
mind and are not sufficiently general to accommodate the
inevitable changes in technology.
PATENT POLICY LEVERS
The need for industry-specific statutory tailoring implicates
the broader question of legal generalization versus particu-
larization, of which the issue of rule-based or standards-
based decisionmaking is, perhaps paradoxically, a particular
instance. Law necessarily contains general prescriptions for
governing behavior, prescriptions that may fit particular
instances well or poorly. Where the fit is poor, it may be sen-
sible to equip decisionmakers with discretion to tailor the gen-
eral prescription. The patent statute equips courts with pre-
cisely such discretion via a series of doctrinal “policy levers”
that allow patents to be calibrated to the needs of particular
industries.
For example, a number of factual questions in patent law
are answered from the perspective of the “person having ordi-
nary skill in the art” (phosita). Much of the case law con-
cerning the phosita arises out of the consideration of the
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was regarded by the Federal Circuit as a nearly absolute prop-
erty rule, and the assumption that a finding of patent infringe-
ment will be accompanied by an injunction was almost uni-
versal from the mid-1980s until 2006. In fact, however, the
patent statute provides only that courtsmay grant injunctive
relief, not that they must.
The legal standard for preliminary injunctive relief has vac-
illated over time. Preliminary injunctions were virtually impos-
sible to obtain before the creation of the Federal Circuit. The
Federal Circuit substantially liberalized the standard for
granting such injunctions in the 1980s, but then tightened
it considerably in the 1990s, to the point where today pre-
liminary injunctions are quite rare. The court has the dis-
cretion under the statute to do something similar with per-
manent injunctive relief. In copyright cases, as opposed to
patent cases, the Supreme Court has on several recent occa-
sions encouraged the lower courts not to grant injunctive relief
as a matter of course.
On rare occasions before 2006, courts in patent cases
refused to grant permanent injunctive relief, for example in
cases where courts found a strong public policy interest in con-
tinued access to the invention. This suggests that injunctive
relief can serve as a policy lever by industry or on a case-by-
case basis. Courts could deny injunctive relief in some indus-
tries altogether. Some consumer advocates suggest that life-
saving drugs ought to fit into this category, for example.
Alternatively, courts could deny injunctive relief on a case-by-
case basis depending on other characteristics that differ by
industry, such as whether the plaintiff actually practices the
invention.
We recently witnessed the creation of a policy lever in real
time. In its 2006 decision in eBay v. MercExchange, the Supreme
Court rejected the longstanding rule that patentees whowon
their cases were automatically entitled to an injunction shut-
ting down the infringing product. Relying on the statutory
language and common-law principles of equity from out-
side patent law, the Court held that the decision whether to
enjoin a defendant’s productmust bemade on a case-by-case
basis after considering four (really three) factors:
■Will the plaintiff suffer irreparable injury without an
injunction, or is there an adequate remedy at law?
■Will the hardship to the defendant from granting an
injunction outweigh the hardship to the plaintiff
from denying the injunction?
■Where does the public interest lie?
The Court emphasized that those determinations should be
on the basis of individual facts, not rigid rules or tests.
Dozens of district courts have applied those standards in
the past two years. Despite the case-by-case nature of the
inquiry, the district court opinions have established some gen-
eral rules. Patentees who compete in the market essentially
always get injunctions under the four-factor test, because it
is extremely difficult to determine what would have hap-
pened in a counterfactual world in which the patentee actu-
ally hadmarket exclusivity. Hence, damages are unlikely to be
adequate as a remedy for the lost market share that infringe-
ment causes. In contrast, patentees that do not participate in
the market, but merely seek to license their patent to those
who do, can almost never satisfy the four-factor test because
by definition what they want is money damages in the form
of a reasonable royalty. Further, almost all of the non-prac-
ticing entity cases arise in complex technology industries in
which the patent covers only a small component of the larg-
er product. In those cases, the balance of the hardships strong-
ly favors the defendant because an injunction will shut down
not merely the infringing technology, but a much larger set
of non-infringing technologies attached to it. There is only
one exception so far to this general rule that practicing enti-
ties get injunctions and non-practicing entities don’t: an
aberrational Texas district court opinion that held that spe-
cial rules should apply to nonprofit entities.
This developing distinction operates as a policy lever.
While practicing and non-practicing entities exist in every
industry, the reality is that in some industries such as phar-
maceuticals, the patentees are almost all practicing entities,
while in the IT industries a high percentage of patent plain-
tiffs are non-practicing entities, sometimes called “trolls” for
the practice of hiding under a bridge and popping up to
demand a toll from surprised passersby. A rule that practic-
ing entities generally get injunctions while non-practicing enti-
ties generally do not has dramatically different effects in the
pharmaceutical and IT industries. Coupled with apportion-
ment of patent damages, a rule that limits injunctions to
plaintiffs that really need them has the potential to help
solve the problems with abuse of the patent systemwhile pre-
serving a strong property rule entitlement for those who
really need it.
INSTITUTIONAL ROLES
The fact that courts proved capable of solving many of the
problems on which new legislation has repeatedly foundered
suggests that policy levers, not industry-specific legislation,
may be themost effective way of dealing with problems in the
patent system. Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.), discussing the
most recent efforts at patent law reform, recently remarked
that Congress cannot leave reform to the courts because
“Congress writes our laws.” But even though Congress
undoubtedlymakes the laws, frequently the best way tomake
those laws work is to write them so that the details of their
application are delegated to the courts.
Skeptics of the judicial approachmight rightly observe that
litigation is not cost-free, that judicial expertise is bounded,
and that appellate courts in particular are not entirely immune
from problems of public choice. However, all advantages are
comparative and the question is not whether courts are the
perfect statutory tailors, but whether we are better off with
no tailoring at all. If we’re not, then given the risks of indus-
try-specific statutes described above, wemust ask if the courts
are better situated to engage in tailoring than are legisla-
tures. The likelihood that a unitary, unvarying, and mono-
lithic statute could supply the correct level of incentive to so
many diverse industries with divergent incentives is essentially
nil. The prospect of the legislature continually revisiting the
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circumstances of each industry and passing appropriate new
legislation for each situation is equally bleak. In democrati-
cally elected legislatures, an enormous commitment of polit-
ical capital is typically required to draft, promulgate, and
reach consensus on new intellectual property legislation,
especially if the legislation is to be supported by credible
fact-finding and reliable expertise. We can anticipate serious
legislative investigation of, and response to, specialized indus-
try needs to be relatively rare and potentially counterpro-
ductive when it does occur.
This is not to say that there cannot be a carefully modu-
lated adjunct role for an agency — in this case, the Patent and
Trademark Office — to play in statutory upkeep. But the
pto by design sees only one piece of the patent puzzle: the
question of whether a patent should issue in the first place.
It never sees infringement disputes, or licenses, or has to
allocate remedies. As a result, even if we thought the ptowere
best suited to setting industry-specific standards for deter-
mining patent validity, there is no reason to believe the pto
staff has any comparative advantage in decidingmany of the
most important questions of patent law. The ptomay be best
suited to creating rules that govern practice before the office
itself, such as the information applicantsmust submit or the
ability of applicants to use continuation applications. Most
particularly, theremay be such a role if the agency can be held
to what it does best, which is fact-finding, without becoming
involved in setting legal standards, which is the strong suit of
the courts. But it is a far cry from application of the pto’s fact-
finding expertise to the sort of dynamic interpretation of legal
rules with which courts have experience, and which we sug-
gest the patent system needs.
“Wait a minute!” some readers might object. “Aren’t you
arguing for judicial activism?” Not so. If “judicial activism”
means anything beyond a conclusory label suggesting that the
speaker disagrees with the court decision, it refers to courts
usurping the role of Congress, generally by invoking the
Constitution to strike down congressional statutes. We are
suggesting something different.Within the framework created
by Congress, there remain a large number of issues to be
determined, and it is the proper job of the courts to resolve
those disputes. That much has been uncontroversial since
Marbury v. Madisonwas decided in 1803. The question is how
courts are to resolve those issues in the absence of congres-
sional guidance and subject to legislative veto. We think it
makes sense for courts in that position to take account of the
realities of the modern patent system. And foremost among
those realities is that our unitary patent law confronts an
amazing diversity of industry needs and experience. For
courts to ignore that diversity in setting the rules it necessarily
must set strikes us as foolish.
CONCLUSION
Both innovation and patent law unquestionably work dif-
ferently in different industries. The law can either take account
of those differences or seek to ignore them. Ignoring them
would require major changes in existing law. It would also
leave the law ill-equipped to deal with the fundamentally
different ways in which innovation works in different indus-
tries. Indeed, given the crisis of confidence the system cur-
rently faces, it is not much of an exaggeration to say that the
patent systemmust bend or break: a patent system that is not
flexible enough to account for these industry differences is
unlikely to survive, let alone accomplish its stated goals. We
believe the system has the flexibility to do both, but this will
require the courts to recognize and use the policy levers they
have been given.
REGULATION SUMMER 20 0 9 23
■ Against Intellectual Monopoly, by Michele
Boldrin and David K. Levine. Cambridge
University Press, 2006.
■ “Consulting PHOSITA,” by Rebecca
Eisenberg. Berkeley Technology Law Journal, Vol.
19 (2004).
■ “Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-
Institutional Approach to Patent System
Reform,” by Arti K. Rai. Columbia Law Review,
Vol. 103 (2003).
■ “How Valuable Is Patent Protection?
Estimates by Technology Field,” by Mark
Schankerman. RAND Journal of Economics, Vol.
29 (1998).
■ Innovation and Its Discontents: How Our Broken
Patent System Is Endangering Innovation and
Progress, and What to Do About It, by Adam Jaffe
and Josh Lerner. Princeton University Press,
2004.
■ “On the Complex Economics of Patent
Scope,” by Robert P. Merges and Richard R.
Nelson. Columbia Law Review, Vol. 90 (1990).
■ “Optimal Patent Length and Breadth,” by
Richard Gilbert and Carl Shapiro. RAND
Journal of Economics, Vol. 21 (1990).
■ Patent Failure: How Bureaucrats, Judges, and
Lawyers Put Innovators at Risk, by James Bessen
and Michael J. Meurer. Princeton University
Press, 2008.
■ “Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking,” by
Mark A. Lemley and Carl Shapiro. Texas Law
Review, Vol. 85 (2007).
■ “Patents and Innovation: An Empirical
Study,” by Edwin Mansfield. Management
Science, Vol. 32 (1986).
■ Patents in the Knowledge-Based Economy, edited
by Wesley M. Cohen and Steven A. Merrill.
National Academies Press, 2003.
■ “Research and Development with
Asymmetric Firm Sizes,” by Richard J. Rosen.
RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 22 (1991).
■ “Rethinking Patent Law in the
Administrative State,” by Orin S. Kerr. William
and Mary Law Review, Vol. 42 (2000).
■ “Standing on the Shoulders of Giants:
Cumulative Research and the Patent Law,” by
Suzanne Scotchmer. Journal of Economic
Perspectives, Vol. 5 (1991).
■ “The Determinants of Patenting in the U.S.
Semiconductor Industry, 1980–1994,” by
Bronwyn H. Hall and Rosemarie Ziedonis.
RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 32 (2001).
■ “The Growing Complexity of the United
States Patent System,” by John R. Allison and
Mark A. Lemley. Boston University Law Review,
Vol. 82 (2002)
■ “Who’s Patenting What? An Empirical
Exploration of Patent Prosecution,” by John
R. Allison and Mark A. Lemley. Vanderbilt Law
Review, Vol. 53 (2000).
R e a d i n g s
R
 
 
Tailoring the Patent System to Promote Innovation  
Dan L. Burk  
Professor of Law, UC Irvine School of Law  
Notes
Anne Hiaring Hocking 
 
Partner
Hiaring+ Smith, LLP
 
Anne Hiaring Hocking 
has specialized in trademark and 
copyright law since 1981.  She is 
Adjunct Professor Trademark, 
Copyright, and International 
Intellectual Property Law at Golden 
Gate University in San Francisco, 
California and Bangkok, Thailand.  
She has chaired numerous 
programs on Intellectual Property 
law topics, and has served as 
President of the San Francisco 
Intellectual Property Law 
Association and speaker and moderator at numerous International 
Trademark Law Association programs.  She has written for AmJur o
copyright and trademark law topics, as well as presented numerous 
papers.  She received her B.A. in German Literature from Reed Col
in 1973 and her J.D. from the University of California, Hastings 
College of the Law in 1979.  In 2006 she received an LLM in 
International Law from Golden Gate University. She studied at the 
Albrecht-Ludwigs Universitaet in Freiburg and the Freie Universi
in Berlin, Germany. She also worked for the Iran Center for 
Management Studies in Teheran, I
n 
lege 
taet 
ran before attending law school. 
 
After working at two large law firms, she was the IP rights attorney 
for Pacific Telesis for five years, where she was responsible for all 
aspects of domestic and international trademark filing and 
enforcement, and all copyright and trade secret procedures.  She 
founded her own firm in 1990 and Hiaring+Smith LLP in 2010. 
9th Annual Conference on Recent 
Developments in Intellectual 
Property Law and Policy
Golden Gate University School of Law
San Francisco
November 5, 2010
Anne Hiaring Hocking
Hiaring + Smith, LLP
San Rafael, California
Five “Hot” Questions
Post-Bose, can anyone prove fraud in the TTAB?
How will increasing court acceptance of DJ 
actions affect trademark practice?
What, if anything, can we learn from recent 
confusion case wins and losses?
What, if anything, can we learn from recent 
dilution case wins and losses?
Has the blogger society beefed up the parody
defense?
I. Proving Fraud in the 
USPTO Post-Bose
 Medinol v. Neuro Vasx, 
67 U.S.P.Q.2d 1205 
(T.T.A.B. 2003)
 “Knew or should have 
known standard” created  
virtually strict liability in 
application and 
registration
I. (cont.)
In re Bose 
Corporation, 580 F.3d 
1204 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
Overturned Medinol
WAVE and ACOUSTIC 
WAVE marks registered, 
but Bose had ceased 
selling audio tape 
recorders and players 10 
years earlier
Board found fraud, 
cancelled Bose’s 
registration of the marks
Bose appealed cancellation
I. (cont.) Court of Appeals 
reaffirmed high 
standard for proving 
fraud
Stated that the Board 
in Medinol “erroneously 
lowered the fraud 
standard to simple 
negligence standard”
“by equating ‘should 
have known’ of the 
falsity with a subjective 
intent”
II. Pleading Fraud in a 
Cancellation Case
No longer sufficient to plead that 
registrant/applicant “knew or should have 
known” mark not in use
Must demonstrate registrant/applicant 
“knowingly ma[d]e[] false, material 
representations” “with the intent to 
deceive”
E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Quala S.A., Opposition 
No. 91186763 (T.T.A.B. December 7, 2009)
Petitioner must provide specific details: who, 
what, when, how of the supposed fraud
Asian and Western Classics B.V. v. Selkow, 92 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1478 (T.T.A.B. 2009)
Must demonstrate fraud “either by its own 
specific factual knowledge or by specific facts 
showing that it is likely to establish such a 
claim”
Daimlerchysler 
Corp. v. American 
Motors Corp., 94 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1086 
(T.T.A.B. 2010)
Fraud claim found 
legally sufficient, 
supported by specific 
statements, evidence
Post-Bose Open Questions
1.
 When exactly does a party’s 
“mistake” or “inadvertence”
become so reckless as to 
constitute the intent to deceive 
element of fraud?
2.
 What role will patent 
inequitable conduct case 
law play in shaping the 
future of trademark fraud 
cases?
III. Likelihood of 
Confusion– Recent 
Lessons
The Designer Cases: HENSLEY and 
ABBOUD
Hensley Mfg. Inc. v. Propride, Inc., 
579 F. 3d 603, (6th Cir. 2009)
 Would there be confusion between 
Jim Hensley’s marks with Hensley 
Mfg. Inc., HENSLEY and HENSLEY 
ARROW, and his new trailer hitch 
designs with ProPride?
 NO, facts did not support a 
claim: defendants no longer used 
HENSLEY or HENSLEY ARROW 
marks, and Jim Hensley used his 
full name, not the mark HENSLEY 
in marketing for ProPride
JA Apparel Corp. v. Abboud, 568 F. 3d. 390. (2d Cir. 
2009) -- Key Contract Language
 “The names, trademarks, trade names, service marks, logos, 
insignias, and designations identified on Schedule 1.1(a)(A), and all 
trademark registrations and applications therefor and the goodwill 
related thereto (collective the “Trademarks”)”
 “All rights to use and apply for the registration of the new trade 
names, trademarks, service marks, logos, insignias and designations 
containing the words “Joseph Abboud,” “designed by Joseph 
Abboud,” “by Joseph Abboud,” “JOE,” or “JA” … (collectively, the 
“New Trademarks”)”
 “Intellectual Property was defined as ‘all of the trademark 
registrations, service mark registrations and applications and 
copyright registrations and applications currently used by 
[Abboud....] in connection with the Trademarks….’”
JA Apparel Corp. v. Abboud, 568 F. 
3d. 390. (2d Cir. 2009)
 Court ruled that JA did not 
acquire “all of Abboud’s 
rights to use his name for 
commercial purposes”
 The difference between 
“name” and “trade name”
 Contract referred only to 
use of ABBOUD as a mark
JA Apparel Corp. v. Abboud, 682 
F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D. N.Y. 2010)
 Injunction preventing 
Abboud from using his 
name as a mark
 Allowed “fair use”: 
Abboud’s name must be 
used descriptively, 
trademark “jaz” must be 
displayed in ad, must 
include disclaimer of 
affiliation with JA Apparel
III. Likelihood of Confusion: 
Practice Note
Rights to use the name must be 
descriptive
Specific reference of waiving the seller’s right 
to the commercial use of the personal name 
prevents ambiguity
Under Section 1115(b)(4) 
III. Likelihood of Confusion 
and Dilution—
Cases of Interest
Hewlett Packard Development Co. v. Vudu Inc., 92 
USPQ 2d 1630
Hewlett Packard opposes registration of the VUDU mark in Class 9 and four 
other classes
Phonetic equivalents with the same connotation goods=computer 
software=likelihood for confusion
III. Likelihood of Confusion: 
Practice Note
Be careful with your description of goods 
and services: tailor it to avoid possible 
oppositions later
The Board can and will look to the literal 
description of goods in your application
Separate applications in separate classes
Heads up for “Generic” Marks
In re 
HOTELS.COM, 573 
f. 3d 1300
CAFC upheld refusal 
to register the mark 
“hotels” generic
 “.com” added 
nothing 
no secondary 
meaning shown
Advertise.com Inc. v. AOL Advertising, 
Inc. FKA August 3, 2010 F 3d. (9th Cir.)
 9th Circuit reversed entry of 
preliminary injunction entered by 
District Court
 AOL’S ADVERTISING.COM 
registration not likely to support 
finding of likelihood of confusion 
with ADVERTISE.COM because of 
probably generic nature of mark
 Genus=“online advertising” or 
“internet advertising”
 Relevant question: What are you?
Answer: “an advertising dot 
com”
III. Practice Note
Procedure oftentimes plays large role in 
TTAB proceedings, despite certain realities 
of the commercial marketplace
Alternative: appeal the refusal to a District 
Court
IV. Clarification on 
Likelihood of Dilution
CHARBUCKS
Starbucks sued Black Bear Micro Roastery for its 
CHARBUCKS BLEND and MISTER CHARBUCKS 
blends
District court dismissed the claim, finding no 
actual dilution
Starbucks appealed…
Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, 
Inc. 588 F. 3d 97 (2d Cir. 2009)
Not necessary to 
prove likelihood of 
confusion to address 
dilution claims
Starbucks’ claims of 
tarnishment and 
blurring both 
dismissed
V. Declaratory Judgment 
Actions after MedImmune
The Declaratory Judgment 
Statute
The Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2201 (a), requires an “actual 
controversy” between parties to the 
declaratory judgment action
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 
549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007)
Addressed whether a 
patent licensee must 
be in breach of 
license agreement to 
bring a declaratory 
judgment action
Supreme Court: no
Article III
Vantage Trailers, Inc. v. Beall Corp., 567 F. 3d 745 (5th Cir. 2009)
-No jurisdiction where the trailer at issue was not yet finalized
-Disputed that Vantage had begun to manufacture a trailer
-Was design sufficiently fixed to allow evaluation of a trademark
infringement?
Monster Cable Products, Inc. v. Euroflex Srl, 
642 F. Supp 2d 1001 (ND Cal. 2009)
 One of the plaintiff’s requests for 
declaratory relief regarding EFI’s 
three pending applications for 
trademark registrations dismissed
 Plaintiff has alleged no facts that this 
is a “real and substantial” dispute
 EFI marks: “MONSTER,” “EUROFLEX,”
“ITALY”
 MCP does not anticipate suit from EFL
 These factors support court’s finding: 
“under the circumstances,” there is 
no substantial controversy
Surefoot LC v. Sure Foot Corp., 531 F. 3d 1236 (10th Cir. 2008)
-Will the concurrent use of the marks cause confusion?
-Sure Foot ND asserts that Surefoot UT’s use of “Surefoot” mark causes 
confusion, therefore infringes on Sure Food ND’s trademark rights
-The “use of SURE-FOOT infringes on Sure Foot’s rights… and creates a 
likelihood of confusion” and “there were several instances of actual confusion”
at a trade show (Sept. 2, 1998 letter)
Express Scripts, Inc. v. Intel Corp, __ F. 
Supp.__ (E.D. Mo. 2010
Intel sent notification letter to filer of an 
“intent to use” application for the mark 
INTELLACT. Defendant is in the pharmacy 
benefit management business
Application for “consulting services regarding 
healthcare costs . . .pharmaceutical benefit 
management services . . . Counseling in the 
nature of drug therapy . . . “
Intel’s  letter did not know of actual use; ESI 
entitled to declaratory judgment
Practice Point: Even the most innocuous cease 
and desist, even before use is known, based 
on an ITU application, could trigger 
jurisdiction.
VI. The Parody Defense
What is a Trademark Parody?
Fourth Circuit:
For trademark purposes, “[a] ‘parody’ is 
defined as a simple form of entertainment 
conveyed by juxtaposing the irreverent 
representation of the trademark with the 
idealized image crated by the mark’s owner
People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. 
Doughney (“PETA”), 263 F.3d 359, 366 (4th Cir. 
2001)
Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Haute Diggity 
Dog, 507 F. 3d 252, 260 (4th Cir. 2007)
Where the famous mark is 
particularly strong, more likely 
that a parody will not impair the 
mark’s distinctiveness
 Defendant’s Chewy Vuiton marks 
are a successful parody and do 
not blur the distinctiveness of 
plaintiff’s marks
Louis Vuitton Malletier v. 
Haute Diggity Dog, 507 F. 3d 
252, 260 (4th Cir. 2007)
Parody Extension in the Dilution 
Statute
 Federal dilution statute excludes any “fair use, including a 
nominative or descriptive fair use, or facilitation of such fair
use, of a famous mark by another person other than as a 
designation of source for the person’s own goods or 
services, including use in connection with—
Advertising or promotion that permits consumers to 
compare goods or services; or
Identifying and parodying, criticizing, or 
commenting upon the famous mark owner or the 
goods or services of the famous mark owner”
15 U.S.C. §1125 (c) (3).
A Case Finding No Infringement and/or 
Dilution
Protectmarriage.com – Yes on 8 v. Courage 
Campaign, 680 F. Supp. 2d 1225 (E.D. CA 2010)
 Organizations for and against gay 
marriage
 Defendant parodied plaintiff’s logo 
depicting both “parents” wearing 
dresses, suggesting same-sex parents
 Used logo on website tracking a 
trial related to Prop 8
 Defendant’s use protected under First 
Amendment
Use relevant to expressive parody
Not explicitly misleading
PI Issued  - Likely Infringement and/or 
Dilution 
Why different from Chewy Vuiton?
Survey, plaintiff sells pet-related items
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Vip Products, LLC, 666 F. Supp. 
2d 974 (ED Missouri 2008)
Parody Cases Tried in 
the Blogger Court
VII. Really Hot Topics 
Worthy of An Entire 
Program
TIFFANY/EBAY and RESCUECOM 
CORP/GOOGLE
Extent to which primary or secondary liability will 
arise for trademark infringement for on-line 
sellers and to online-advertisers 
Tiffany v. eBay Inc., 600 F. 3d 93 (2d 
Cir. 2010)
 eBay not liable as direct or 
contributory infringer when third 
parties sell infringing merchandise
 eBay’s general knowledge of 
infringing sales did not impose 
duty to remedy problem
 Actual knowledge standard or no 
duty to take down: burden shifting 
to trademark owner
Rescuecom Corp. v. Google 562 F. 
3d 123 (2d Cir. 2009)
Challenges search 
engines’ practice of 
selling proprietary 
trademarks as ‘keywords’
Looks like the practice is 
sanctioned. Similar 
results in the EU
Google Cases in the ECJ
 Platform liability: Does the site infringe for if 
customers sell counterfeit or infringing product? 
Mixed results in the EU cases – on appeal to the 
ECJ
 Search engine liability: Does Google infringe for 
selling Adwords, or is it a hosting service? Various 
results in European cases.
 Yes, Google’s AdWords system is a hosting service
Did find use in commerce, but nominative fair 
use and no likelihood of confusion
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1 | Trademark Law Update: 
Preliminary Injunctions and 
Summary Judgments
Trademark Preliminary Injunction
Factors
 Likely success on the merits
 Likely irreparable injury
 Balance of harms favors movant
 Public interest (not being confused)
2 | Trademark Law Update: 
Preliminary Injunctions and 
Summary Judgments
Trademark Preliminary Injunction
General presumption:
likely success on the merits > irreparable harm
3 | Trademark Law Update: 
Preliminary Injunctions and 
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Trademark Preliminary Injunction
4 | Trademark Law Update: 
Preliminary Injunctions and 
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Trademark Preliminary Injunction
Presumption Freight Train
 Copying > Presumed secondary meaning
 Copying > Presumed intent to infringe
 Intent to infringe > Presumed infringement
 Infringement > Presumed irreparable injury
= 
Preliminary Injunction
see Schwinn v Ross, 870 F3d 1176 (7th Cir 1989)
5 | Trademark Law Update: 
Preliminary Injunctions and 
Summary Judgments
Trademark Preliminary Injunction
New Rule?
Recent Supreme Court cases indicate need for 
independent proof of likely irreparable injury
26 | Trademark Law Update: 
Preliminary Injunctions and 
Summary Judgments
Supreme Court Cases
 eBay v MercExChange, 547 U.S. 388 (2006)(patent 
infringement; permanent injunction)
 Winter v Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. ___, 129 
S.Ct. 365 (2008)(preliminary injunction; federal 
environmental law; reversing 9th Circuit)
7 | Trademark Law Update: 
Preliminary Injunctions and 
Summary Judgments
Lower Courts
 No presumption of irreparable injury; require proof of its likelihood
 N Am Med v Axiom, 522 F3d 303 (5th Cir 2008)(rule applicable to 
trademark cases)
 Maxim v Quintana, 654 FSupp2d 1024 (N.D. Cal 2009)(trademark 
infringement; citing Winter; plaintiffs “no longer entitled to a 
presumption of irreparable harm”)
 CytoSport v Vital, 617 FSupp2d 1051 (E.D. Cal. 2009)(trademark 
infringement; citing Winter; “plaintiff must demonstrate that irreparable 
injury is likely”) aff’d mem 348 Fed Appx 288 (9th Cir 2009)
8 | Trademark Law Update: 
Preliminary Injunctions and 
Summary Judgments
Trademark Summary Judgment
“This case is yet another example of the wisdom of 
the well-established principle that because of the intensely 
factual nature of trademark disputes, summary judgment 
is generally disfavored in the trademark arena.”
- Fortune v Victoria’s Secret, 618 F3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir 2010)
9 | Trademark Law Update: 
Preliminary Injunctions and 
Summary Judgments
Trademark Summary Judgment 
Granted 2008 - 2010
 Venture v. McGills, 540 F.3d 56 (1st Cir. 2008)(confusion likely)
 George v. Imagination, 575 F.3d 383 (4th Cir. 2009)(confusion unlikely)
 Universal v. Collezione, 618 F3d 417 (4th Cir. 2010) (confusion likely)
 Bd. of Supervisors v. Smack, 550 F.3d 465 (5th Cir. 2008)(confusion likely)
 General Conference v. McGill, 617 F3d 402 (6th Cir. 2010) (confusion likely)
 Sensient v. Sensory Effects, 613 F.3d 754 (8th Cir. 2010) (confusion unlikely)
 Utah Lighthouse v Foundation, 527 F3d 1045 (10th Cir. 2008)(confusion unlikely)
 Tana v. Dantanna’s, 611 F.3d 767 (11th Cir. 2010) (confusion unlikely)
 Odom’s v. FF Acquisition, 600 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (confusion unlikely)
10 | Trademark Law Update: 
Preliminary Injunctions and 
Summary Judgments
Trademark Summary Judgment
both for food flavorings
Confusion Likely Confusion Unlikely Motion Denied
613 F3d 754
11 | Trademark Law Update: 
Preliminary Injunctions and 
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Trademark Summary Judgment
Confusion Likely Confusion Unlikely Motion Denied
both for restaurants
611 F3d 767
312 | Trademark Law Update: 
Preliminary Injunctions and 
Summary Judgments
Trademark Summary Judgment
Motion DeniedConfusion UnlikelyConfusion Likely
both for conducting religious observances
617 F3d 402
13 | Trademark Law Update: 
Preliminary Injunctions and 
Summary Judgments
Trademark Summary Judgment
Motion DeniedConfusion UnlikelyConfusion Likely
for foods for grocery store services
600 F3d 1343
14 | Trademark Law Update: 
Preliminary Injunctions and 
Summary Judgments
Trademark Summary Judgment
Motion DeniedConfusion UnlikelyConfusion Likely
both for car sales
605 F3d 931
15 | Trademark Law Update: 
Preliminary Injunctions and 
Summary Judgments
Trademark Summary Judgment
Motion DeniedConfusion UnlikelyConfusion Likely
618 F3d 1025
16 | Trademark Law Update: 
Preliminary Injunctions and 
Summary Judgments
Trademark Summary Judgment
Motion DeniedConfusion UnlikelyConfusion Likely
576 F3d 221
17 | Trademark Law Update: 
Preliminary Injunctions and 
Summary Judgments
Trademark Summary Judgment
Motion DeniedConfusion UnlikelyConfusion Likely
both for games
575 F3d 383
418 | Trademark Law Update: 
Preliminary Injunctions and 
Summary Judgments
Trademark Summary Judgment
Motion DeniedConfusion UnlikelyConfusion Likely
both for apparel
550 F3d 465
19 | Trademark Law Update: 
Preliminary Injunctions and 
Summary Judgments
Trademark Summary Judgment
Motion DeniedConfusion UnlikelyConfusion Likely
both for religious services
527 F3d 1045
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